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STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE 
Kelli A. Alces* 
Creditors exercise significant power over financially distressed corporations, 
thereby pushing corporate managers further into the realm of unprofitable risk 
aversion. The heavy hand of creditor power and the threats creditors are able to 
make to managers’ professional stability and success misalign senior officers’ 
incentives by undermining their freedom to make wealth-maximizing decisions on 
behalf of the corporation. The importance of independent managerial decision 
making is paramount in the law of corporate governance and that independence 
has been inefficiently undermined by the exertion of oppressive creditor control. 
This Article resolves the problem by creating a mechanism to balance shareholder 
and creditor influence over management so that no one constituent is able to 
dominate or undermine the independence of managerial decision making. A new 
shareholder representative called an “equity trustee” will represent shareholder 
interests during times of financial distress. The equity trustee gives voice to 
shareholder preferences in times when creditors are likely to dictate terms of 
governance so that the creditor voice does not grow too strong. The equity trustee 
should serve to balance competing preferences so that managers maintain 
independence and the ability to make value-maximizing decisions without fear of 
destructive retribution from either shareholders or creditors. 
INTRODUCTION 
Once a corporation is at risk of defaulting on major bank loans, an effective 
change in control occurs, and the mechanisms that tied the managers’ interests to 
those of the corporation through the interests of shareholders fail.1 The traditional 
mechanisms of fiduciary duties and incentive compensation are inadequate when it 
                                                                                                                
    * Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. I am 
grateful for helpful comments from and conversations with Professors Robin Craig, Brian 
Galle, Jonathan Klick, James Park, Gregg Polsky, Larry Ribstein, Mark Seidenfeld, David 
Skeel, Lois Shepherd, and participants in the FSU Faculty Enrichment Series Workshop, the 
2008 Law & Society Conference, and the 2008 SEALS Young Scholars’ Workshop. Special 
thanks go to Melissa Murphy for valuable research assistance. 
    1. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing 
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1228–29 (2006) (arguing that 
when a corporation falters, the ability of institutional lenders and creditors to control the 
cash flow of the corporation is a “potent threat” and managers will respond by shifting their 
loyalties away from the corporation and toward the creditors and lenders who have 
significant influence over the corporation). 
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comes to giving the managers2 of troubled companies wealth-maximizing 
incentives. During this tumultuous time, the shareholders’ limited power over the 
firm’s management pales in comparison to the sword the company’s institutional 
lenders can wield against the senior officers, the directors, and even the 
corporation itself.3 Deference to creditors in a time of financial difficulty, no 
matter how severe, is neither necessarily the path to corporate wealth 
maximization nor consistent with the tenets of corporate law.4 When the 
corporation is in financial trouble, the shareholder voice is often silenced. This 
weakening of the shareholder position, combined with the extreme power creditors 
may exercise over managers when the corporation is insolvent, leads to a level of 
risk aversion5 that may not result in wealth-maximizing decisions on the 
corporation’s behalf. Because the managers can never be sure of precisely where 
they are in the solvency spectrum, adopting the course of action preferred by either 
the shareholders or creditors will not necessarily guarantee that the managers will 
make the decision or adopt the level of risk that is best for the firm. Neither 
constituent can be relied upon to advocate consistently for positions that would 
lead to wealth-maximizing behavior. The best way to address this problem is to 
balance the amount of influence each group can exert over corporate managers 
throughout the life of the firm. 
Contrary to the supposition of many judicial decisions6 and much of the 
scholarship7 in recent years, the problem is not one of fiduciary duties or of a 
                                                                                                                
    2. Throughout this Article, the term “managers” refers to a corporation’s senior 
officers. 
    3. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1231. 
    4. It is axiomatic that a solvent corporation is to be operated for the benefit of 
its shareholders. Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate 
Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1384 (2007) (explaining that the corporation 
is owned by the shareholders and they possess economic and voting rights in the 
corporation). 
    5. A risk-averse person is one who “considers the utility of a certain prospect of 
money income to be higher than the expected utility of an uncertain prospect of equal 
expected monetary value.” ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 51 
(2004). For example, a risk-averse person would prefer a situation in which she was 
guaranteed a return of $25 to one where she had a 25% chance of receiving $100 even 
though the expected monetary value of each is $25. See AVINASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, 
GAMES OF STRATEGY 174 (1999). 
    6. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. Inc. v. Gheewalla, 
930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007); Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. 
Ch. 2004); Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386 (Del. Ch. 1999); Geyer v. 
Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
    7. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors’ 
Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 336 (2007); Hu & 
Westbrook, supra note 4; Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: 
Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1993); Jonathan C. 
Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed 
Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein & Kelli A. Alces, Directors’ 
Duties in Failing Firms, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 529, 529 (2007). 
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particular “zone of insolvency”;8 rather, it is one of properly aligning managerial 
incentives at all levels of financial success and difficulty. Creditors and scholars 
alike have framed the problem of conflicting shareholder and creditor interests as 
one that plagues only corporations within the “zone of insolvency,” because of the 
perceived shift in the fiduciary duties directors owe once a corporation is 
insolvent.9 The debate has lasted several years and was originally born of the 
understanding that directors owed fiduciary duties to the firm’s creditors in 
insolvency. Creditors sought to extend the duties owed during insolvency to 
something they referred to as the “zone of insolvency.”10 Dicta in some Delaware 
cases muddied the waters by seemingly assuming, without holding, that such a 
duty to creditors does exist.11 Legal scholars took up the interesting and puzzling 
question of how to treat directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency, a time when 
the directors still owe fiduciary duties to shareholders and the corporation, but 
must also address a loyalty claimed by creditors of the troubled company.12 
Because the exact point of insolvency is very difficult to determine, directors are 
faced with the problem of not quite knowing when and how their loyalties are 
supposed to shift. Several commentators concluded that the business judgment rule 
protects directors from liability for mistaking whose interests to prefer as between 
creditors and shareholders.13 Directors owe duties to the corporation itself, within 
                                                                                                                
    8. The “zone of insolvency” is most commonly used to refer to that time in a 
corporation’s life when insolvency is imminent. Because it is not possible to determine the 
exact moment a corporation becomes insolvent, courts and creditors speak of the “zone of 
insolvency” when talking about the time during which a switch to creditor preferences may 
be appropriate. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 94. In this Article, I expand the definition of this 
“zone” to include the time when the corporation is in serious financial trouble, such that 
default on loan obligations is highly probable. The likelihood of default increases the 
likelihood of insolvency because one default may result in a domino effect by constituting a 
default on other obligations. If the corporation is in default on all of its loans, all of its 
creditors will be able to demand immediate payment in full and those demands may 
inevitably lead to the company’s insolvency. 
    9. Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1339–43. “Zone of insolvency” is difficult 
to define. That difficulty makes rules dependent on it impractical. The supposition that the 
rules or methods of corporate governance should change upon the perceived imminence of 
insolvency is simply wrong, as demonstrated by recent court decisions, and leads scholars to 
devise arbitrary and impractical solutions. See, e.g., Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101, 103 
(holding that only actual insolvency will allow creditors to sue derivatively for breach of 
fiduciary duty by directors and that creditors have a direct action for breach of fiduciary 
duty in bankruptcy); Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7, at 536 (This article argues that 
increased fiduciary duties owed to creditors in failing firms is unnecessary. Rather, the 
business judgment rule should apply to decisions made by the debtor and a “strong duty of 
loyalty is appropriate only when the agent delegates open-ended discretion to the 
principal.”); Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1321 (arguing for the abolition of insolvency 
as the measure for duty shifting and instead using bankruptcy as the measure). 
  10. See, e.g., Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 94; Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 772; 
Odyssey, 735 A.2d at 386; Geyer, 621 A.2d at 784. 
  11. Geyer, 621 A.2d at 787–91; Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7, at 529. 
  12. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 7; Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4; Lin, 
supra note 7; Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7. 
  13. Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 366–67; Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7, at 536–
37; see also Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 
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or without insolvency.14 This inquiry into directors’ duties in a distressed firm has 
been valuable and has brought attention to an important problem in corporate 
governance. Still, the inquiry has not resolved the issue of conflicting shareholder 
and creditor preferences and influence in financially unstable firms. It has so far 
failed in that attempt, not for lack of reasoning or creativity, but because it asks the 
wrong question. Addressing the problem through personal liability for breach of 
fiduciary duty by corporate directors without considering the incentives of the 
firm’s senior officers—its most prominent, everyday decision makers—misses the 
most important aspect of a corporate manager’s internal conflict during the zone of 
insolvency. 
The focus on fiduciary duties is particularly misplaced when addressing 
the incentives of corporate managers. Fiduciary duties are one way to exercise 
control over directors’ decisions by threatening punishment ex post, but suits for 
breach of fiduciary duty, particularly those brought derivatively by shareholders, 
do not often result in judgments against corporate directors.15 Procedural 
anomalies under Delaware law make it almost impossible to reach corporate 
officers in derivative suits alleging breach of fiduciary duty.16 Protections for 
directors are intentionally built into the derivative suit mechanism so that directors 
will feel free to take beneficial risks on behalf of the corporation.17 Chief among 
these protections is the business judgment rule, which shields directors from 
personal liability for informed decisions made in good faith that the director 
rationally believed to be in the best interests of the corporation.18 A corporate 
officer or director could make a decision that honors either shareholder or creditor 
preferences without exceeding the bounds of proper business judgment and 
thereby subjecting herself to personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty.19 Even 
                                                                                                                
12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); see infra note 19 and 
accompanying text. 
  14. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55; Ribstein & Alces, supra 
note 7, at 538. 
  15. See Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the 
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. 
REV. 261, 271 (1986). 
  16. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate 
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 905 (2003). 
  17. See William T. Quillen, The Federal–State Corporate Law Relationship–A 
Response to Professor Seligman’s Call for Federal Preemption of State Corporate 
Fiduciary Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 107, 118–19 (1993) (stating that the decision in Smith v. 
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), “discourag[ed] qualified outsiders from serving on 
corporate boards . . . because the risk of personal liability . . . was not worth the reward of 
serving on a corporate board”). 
  18. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[The business judgment 
rule] is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted 
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interests of the company.”). 
  19. See Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55. Chancellor Allen used 
the example of a solvent corporation with a $12 million debt whose only asset is a $51 
million judgment with an expected value of $15.5 million which takes into account the 
chances of the judgment being affirmed, modified, or reversed on appeal. The Chancellor 
found that creditors would accept a settlement offer over $12 million, but shareholders 
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well-meaning managers making business decisions on behalf of the corporation in 
good faith will be pulled in different directions according to the power 
shareholders can exert over corporate management and any loan terms that may 
serve to grant creditors eventual control. 
This Article addresses that internal struggle confronting managers. The 
competing interests vying for managerial favor in the zone of insolvency can 
indeed prove costly for the corporation, but this struggle does not involve an 
actionable breach of fiduciary duty. Rather, it is the consequence of personal 
incentives operating on managers who are making good faith decisions that would 
pass muster when held up to the business judgment standard. A focus on assigning 
liability for breach of fiduciary duty is not only inefficient and completely 
ineffective in most instances; it does not solve the real problem that confronts 
corporate managers even when the corporation is indubitably solvent—what 
investment strategy to use when the corporation is in a financially precarious 
position. 
The conflict between shareholder and creditor interests that weighs on 
management is not necessarily caused by a fundamental uncertainty about which 
course of action is best for the corporation. The business decision may be difficult, 
but it is one corporate managers could make in a relative vacuum in which they 
could conceive of a “corporate” good without regard to a “shareholder good” or 
“creditor good.”20 The corporate managers’ personal interests necessarily guide 
                                                                                                                
could reject a higher settlement because of the chance that the initial $51 million judgment 
would be affirmed. The Chancellor explained that: 
[I]f we consider the community of interests that the corporation 
represents it seems apparent that one should in this hypothetical 
accept the best settlement offer available providing it is greater than 
$15.55 million, and one below that amount should be rejected. But 
that result will not be reached by a director who thinks he owes duties 
directly to shareholders only. It will be reached by directors who are 
capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal and economic 
entity. Such directors will recognize that in managing the business 
affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, 
circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient and the 
fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice 
that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or any single 
group interested in the corporation) would make if given the 
opportunity to act. 
Id.; Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7, at 538 (arguing that shifting fiduciary 
duties during insolvency creates a dilemma between the demands of creditors 
and shareholders with risks for both constituencies. Further, a “judicially 
imposed duty” would create uncertainty because of the “difficulty of defining  
. . . the ‘zone’ of insolvency.”). 
  20. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55. Henry Hu has disputed the 
clear existence of a “corporate good,” arguing that many difficult decisions do not present 
themselves as being clearly risk averse or risk seeking and for which the wealth maximizing 
answer is not clear. Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate 
Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 318–32 (1990). Even Hu acknowledges that a greater 
risk preference on the part of corporate managers would be healthy pre-bankruptcy. Id. at 
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the decision they make on behalf of the corporation. Those personal interests are 
not the sort of self interests whose indulgence would constitute a breach of 
fiduciary duty. Rather, they are a necessary part of aligning the interests of 
corporate managers with those of the firm’s owners, a crucial mechanism used to 
reduce the agency costs inherent in the separation of ownership and control that 
defines the corporate form.21 These are the personal interests that we must balance 
and conquer if we are to increase the likelihood that managers make the value 
maximizing decision. The key is to balance the influences shareholders and 
creditors may each exert over management so that neither party is so 
overwhelming as to compromise the independent decision making abilities of the 
company’s officers. 
The answer is to provide shareholders a voice to advance the shareholder 
position up to and through insolvency, and so to create a party that has an incentive 
to advocate shareholder interests when major corporate debt decisions are made 
and while the corporation is in financial trouble. This “equity trustee” would 
represent shareholder interests in negotiating loan terms, inform and advise 
shareholders about how to use their voting power during times of financial 
distress, and have the power to bring lawsuits in the shareholders’ stead. Loan 
covenants in the loan agreements and the significant collateral taken to secure 
some of the enormous loans banks make to corporations allow dominant creditors 
to coerce the managers of a troubled company into taking the steps these creditors 
prefer.22 Once we have reached the point at which the corporation is vulnerable to 
creditor threats, it is too late to make a principled stand against powerful creditors, 
particularly at a time when the shareholders have little or no incentive to exert 
energy or resources to affect corporate action. The problem must be adequately 
anticipated and planned for ex ante in a way that does not assume away 
shareholder interests in times of financial distress. These interests can provide a 
balance against the extreme risk aversion that is prevalent around the zone of 
insolvency and, therefore, lead to greater corporate wealth maximization. As long 
as the firm is planning to reorganize rather than liquidate, equity prefers wealth 
generation beyond what is needed to repay creditors. That should be recognized 
and honored. 
This Article advances the literature by breaking with a significant body of 
scholarship that approaches the problem as one of misplaced fiduciary duties,23 
and offers an alternative for how best to align managerial incentives through 
incentive compensation both in and out of bankruptcy.24 Those who have noted the 
                                                                                                                
330 n.145 (“When a corporation seems headed for bankruptcy, it may be shareholder-
optimal for a manager to engage in risk-seeking behavior.”). 
  21. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 
(1976). 
  22. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1211. 
  23. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 7; Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4; Lin, 
supra note 7; Lipson, supra note 7; Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7, at 529. 
  24. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive 
Compensation When Agency Costs are Low, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1543 (2007); Yair 
Listokin, Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy: Why CEOs Should Be Compensated with 
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effects of enhanced institutional creditor control in the zone of insolvency have 
stopped short of deciding whether the phenomenon is a problem.25 This Article 
demonstrates that creditor control poses a threat to corporate wealth maximization 
and, further, suggests a novel solution that vindicates the corporate law priority of 
managerial independence under the sole supervision of the board of directors. 
Others who have looked at officer incentive problems in the zone of insolvency 
have turned to traditional mechanisms such as incentive compensation to find an 
answer.26 This Article explains why such an approach may be inadequate and 
shows how a process that encourages open bargaining between parties with 
relevant interests better minimizes the agency costs associated with managerial 
decision making in financially distressed firms. 
Solving problems of misaligned managerial incentives with the limited 
use of a new shareholder representative is a project that has many parts. This 
Article is but the first necessary step in a larger project aimed at creating the equity 
trustee and defining the exact circumstances of its most beneficial use. Future 
research will more fully develop the innovation and will explore insights into how 
the equity trustee would affect corporate governance as a whole and what 
implications the use of such a trustee could have throughout the life of a 
corporation. This Article begins the project by elucidating the problem confronting 
managers in the zone of insolvency for the first time in a way that shows the 
problem to be one of incentives and the effects of creditor control, and not one of 
breached fiduciary duties. It illustrates how an equity trustee would be an effective 
tool in solving the problem at hand. 
In Part I, the Article will look at shareholder influence over the 
management of a healthy corporation. It describes the preferences held by 
shareholders and tools at their disposal to influence managerial decision making. 
Part II then explains how creditor power reserved through loan covenants strongly 
influences managers and makes them even more risk-averse in troubled times than 
they are when the corporation is comfortably solvent. Part III demonstrates that 
this strong deference to the power of creditors applies not only when the 
corporation is insolvent, but also in healthier times when the chance of financial 
difficulty may loom on the horizon. Part IV examines the internal struggle 
managers face in appropriately balancing the competing interests of shareholders 
and creditors in order to make the best decision for the corporation while avoiding 
harm to their personal interests and livelihood. It shows how this struggle begins 
with the negotiation of a loan agreement and ends in misaligned incentives when 
the corporation is in financial trouble. Having established in Part IV why the 
current system is flawed, the Article in Part V considers how best to solve the 
problem. Part V defines the role and expected efficacy of an equity trustee, and 
explains how the limited use of an equity trustee may counter overwhelming 
creditor interests and afford managers more freedom to make the decisions most 
likely to lead to wealth maximization. Part V also explains why other attempts to 
                                                                                                                
Debt, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 777 (2007); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New 
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 920 (2003). 
  25. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1250. 
  26. See Henderson, supra note 24; Listokin, supra note 24; Skeel, supra note 24, 
at 920. 
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address this problem have fallen short, and why the equity trustee is a superior 
solution. 
I. SHAREHOLDER PREFERENCES AND INFLUENCE 
Corporate law has well established that a corporation’s management owes 
its loyalties to shareholders.27 Shareholders own the company. Much of modern 
corporate law and scholarship has focused on the agency problem resulting from 
the separation of the ownership and control of a corporation, identified by Adolf 
A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means over seventy-five years ago.28 The solutions to 
the problem have sought to align management’s interests with those of 
shareholders, by imposing legal obligations on managers and giving them 
incentives to operate the company in the best interests of its collective, and often 
widely dispersed, owners.29 Directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, 
enforceable by shareholders, to manage the business in a manner they “reasonably 
believe[] to be in the best interests of the corporation”30 and, through the 
corporation, its shareholders.31 When a corporation is solvent, its shareholders are 
the clear beneficiaries of the fiduciary duties owed to the firm by management.32 
These fiduciary duties work largely to constrain the behavior of directors, but their 
relevance to senior officers is murky at best.33 Shareholders cling tenaciously to 
the fiduciary duties directors owe, although it is not clear at all that these duties are 
effective in ensuring that those who are truly responsible for managing the 
corporation do so in a manner that comports with the preferences of its equity 
holders. 
                                                                                                                
  27. Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1356 (“[T]he directors owe fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.” (quoting Paramount 
Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994))). 
  28. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1214 (citing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & 
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)). 
  29. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW & ECONOMICS 408–09 (2002). 
  30. REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2007). 
  31. Paramount Commc’ns, 637 A.2d at 43; Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 
1356 (citing REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) official cmt. n.2 (2005)). 
  32. These fiduciary obligations exist because shareholders delegate open-ended 
control over the corporation to its directors. Such wide discretion requires a fiduciary 
standard to align the agent directors’ incentives with those of the principals, the 
shareholders. See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 
217 (2005) (“[A] fiduciary duty is appropriate only where the owner delegates open-ended 
power to the manager . . . [a] [c]lassic example[] where the costs are justified include[s] the 
relationship between management and dispersed owners in a traditional publicly held 
corporation . . . .”). 
  33. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, Corporate Governance and the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act: The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1149, 1194, 1225 (2004); Thompson & Sale, supra note 16, at 905 (explaining that 
federal law is currently attempting to fill in some of the gaps in Delaware law relating to the 
ability to impose liability and maintain “suits for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care”). 
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A. Diversification and Risk Preferences 
The agency costs inherent in the separation of ownership and control will 
not completely disappear under any compensation scheme.34 Well-diversified 
shareholders will never be able to bring managers’ incentives and goals for 
managing the corporation completely in line with their own. For one thing, 
shareholders own very small pieces of a number of companies and so are more or 
less equally invested in varying firms and industries.35 Senior officers, by 
definition, have a far greater investment in the one firm. They only have one job 
and professional reputation to protect. Future employment and compensation 
prospects depend on the perceived success of the firm they manage.36 A senior 
officer may lose his job at the hands of unhappy board members whose continued 
service on the board is thrown into question by the corporation’s lack of success,37 
or he may be unseated at the behest of influential bank creditors.38 Even if the 
officer is not removed immediately after the firm’s change in fortune, the market 
for corporate control will know of his failure and it may be difficult, if not 
impossible (depending on the size of the business failure), for him to secure a 
similar position at a corporation of similar stature.39 The manager’s very 
livelihood, then, and often a substantial portion of his wealth, is tied up in the 
corporation’s success. This significant personal investment makes managers less 
willing to cause the corporation to make the high risk investments or decisions that 
may lead to proportionately higher returns that shareholders would like.40 
                                                                                                                
  34. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 21, at 308 (“[I]t is generally impossible 
for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal 
decisions from the principal’s viewpoint.”). 
  35. See Hu, supra note 20, at 319 (“A shareholder typically can diversify away 
much of the risk associated with any single corporation through the simple expedient of 
holding a portfolio of stocks.”). 
  36. Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1351 (“A shareholder has shares in many 
companies; a manager has only one job. Moreover, from stock options and other securities 
holdings, managers are typically poorly diversified.”). 
  37. Shareholders cannot remove underperforming officers directly. The senior 
officers of a corporation are chosen by its directors who are elected by shareholders. If 
shareholders want to remove an officer from his position, they must exert pressure on the 
board of directors or install a new board that will choose different officers. See BAINBRIDGE, 
supra note 29, at 441 (“Shareholders have virtually no right to initiate corporate action and, 
moreover, are entitled to approve or disapprove only a very few board actions.”). The 
shareholders thus do not have a right to remove officers of the corporation and as 
individuals have only limited power to exert pressure on the board of directors. 
  38. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1244–45. 
  39. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 921, 931–32 (2007). 
  40. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 21. This article develops a 
theory of the ownership structure of the firm. Jensen & Meckling explain that as the owner–
manager’s equity decreases: 
his incentive to devote significant effort to creative activities such as 
searching out new profitable ventures falls. He may in fact avoid such 
ventures simply because it requires too much trouble or effort on his part 
to manage or to learn about new technologies. Avoidance of these 
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This agency problem means that managers are more risk-averse than 
shareholders would prefer when it comes to making decisions about how to run the 
corporation. Managers are less likely to take the potentially profitable risks 
diversified shareholders would want them to take because the managers stand to 
lose more than the shareholders would if the risk is not ultimately profitable.41 A 
diversified shareholder’s portfolio is designed to absorb the losses associated with 
unsuccessful risks.42 As Professor Henry Hu points out, well-diversified 
shareholders have different risk and time preferences than poorly diversified 
shareholders, as well as different preferences than management may have or think 
the shareholders have.43 He argues that, despite public perceptions to the contrary, 
shareholders want corporations to engage in investment activity that entails a high 
degree of total risk, as long as that risk is “diversifiable” by the shareholder in 
designing his portfolio.44 
Incentive compensation tools such as options encourage risk taking by 
allowing managers to enjoy the fruits of a successful strategy without being 
directly penalized if the investment fails.45 These options may even make 
managers “too” risk-seeking when the corporation is healthy.46 While the promises 
of great wealth that accompany stock options and other aggressive forms of 
incentive compensation may make managers more risk-preferring, officers remain 
consistently more risk-averse than the well-diversified shareholder.47 
                                                                                                                
personal costs and the anxieties that go with them also represent a source 
of on the job utility . . . . 
Id. at 313. 
  41. See Hu, supra note 20, at 320. This article states that: 
Specifically, a diversified shareholder would not want the managers of a 
publicly held corporation to act in a way intended to ensure the well-
being of the corporation. If managers were to focus on the total risk of an 
investment project instead of the nondiversifiable risk, for instance, they 
might enhance the health of the firm, but they would probably not 
maximize the share price. Shareholders, regardless of their individual 
risk preferences, generally would want managers instead to focus 
primarily on nondiversifiable risk in evaluating corporate investment 
opportunities. 
Id. at 299–300. 
  42. Michael Abramowicz, Speeding up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 
139, 145 (2003); see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 259. 
  43. Hu, supra note 20, at 287–94. 
  44. Id. 
  45. Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1901, 1930–31 (2001). 
  46. Hu, supra note 20, at 319, 327–29; Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood 
Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory 
Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1492–95 (1993). 
  47. See Hu, supra note 20, at 318–19 (explaining that despite the promise of 
stock options to managers they “may be much less well diversified than shareholders as a 
result of the large amounts of ‘human capital’ . . . invested in their corporations . . . 
caus[ing] managers to be overly sensitive to risk.”); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 21, at 
352. Jensen and Meckling explain that where a manager has fractional ownership of a 
corporation his incentives will not exactly mirror that of the corporation, but:  
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Management’s natural risk aversion is heightened considerably by the loan 
agreements they enter on behalf of the corporation and the power over corporate 
management that significant creditors can exercise as a result.48 
One of the basic justifications of the business judgment rule, which is 
designed to protect directors from personal liability for failed good faith business 
decisions, is that corporate risk taking is beneficial to shareholders, and imposing 
personal liability on managers when the business decisions fail would serve only to 
discourage often profitable corporate risks. A well-diversified shareholder does not 
care if one corporation takes a risk that fails; she may not even care if one 
corporation becomes insolvent.49 It is axiomatic of corporate investment that big 
returns accompany big risks.50 Rational, well-diversified shareholders want 
corporate managers to take significant, though well-calculated and intelligent, risks 
in designing the corporation’s investment strategy. However, shareholder influence 
over managerial decision making has always been limited. 
B. Mechanisms of Shareholder Influence 
While directors are technically in charge51 of the corporation’s 
management under Delaware corporate law,52 the real decision makers of the 
                                                                                                                
forces exist to determine an equilibrium distribution of outside 
ownership. If the costs of reducing the dispersion of ownership are lower 
than the benefits to be obtained from reducing the agency costs, it will 
pay some individual or group of individuals to buy shares in the market 
to reduce the dispersion of ownership. 
Id. 
  48. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, 1217–18. 
  49. Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 
345 (1997). Adler argues: 
[A] combination of preferred equity and debt allows dispersed investors 
to enjoy the advantages of fixed obligations without fear of liquidation 
while a firm is likely to be viable, and permits these investors to benefit 
from liquidation through creditor competition for assets when the firm is 
likely to be inviable. Bankruptcy law interferes with this design by 
protecting even those firms that should not continue . . . . The occasional 
successful rescue of a viable firm may not justify this ubiquitous cost. 
Id. 
  50. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate 
Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 549–50 (1983) (illustrating a hypothetical situation 
in which the higher payout to the corporation and dividends to shareholders includes the 
most risk and vice versa). 
  51. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors . . . .”).  
  52. Corporations flock to Delaware to incorporate due to the specialized 
corporate court system, extensive and widely known case law, and friendly statutory law 
including protection for directors from personal liability relating to duty of care violations. 
For this reason, Delaware law is the most relevant in considering the law governing large, 
public corporations. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 725–30 (2002). 
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corporation are the CEO and the rest of the senior management team.53 The 
directors of large, public corporations serve on several boards and usually hold 
demanding day jobs.54 Each directorship is but a part-time job. The board of 
directors votes on major corporate decisions, and in doing so, often defers to the 
recommendations and judgments of the senior management team. The day-to-day 
decisions and the specific details of the major decisions for the firm are made and 
devised by the senior officers.55 These officers are not seriously constrained by 
fiduciary duties to the corporation or its shareholders.56 
Shareholder powers are more directly designed to constrain the board of 
directors. Shareholders can elect board members, initiate proxy contests to replace 
the current board, and combine their votes in ways that may achieve some of their 
objectives.57 The directors the shareholders elect choose the company’s officers, so 
shareholders only indirectly affect who serves as a corporate manager.58 
Shareholders can excite public outrage or at least bring public attention to bad 
management in an effort to force the board’s hand or, in extreme circumstances, to 
lobby for legislation that may affect corporate decision making.59 Shareholders 
attempt to align managerial incentives and minimize agency costs through 
incentive compensation packages and employment terms.60 These terms are 
negotiated on the shareholders’ behalf by the board of directors. Employment 
terms aim to align senior officers’ incentives with the goals of shareholders and 
measure success largely in terms of increased stock price.61 Managers are 
                                                                                                                
  53. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes–Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, 
Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 954–56 (2003) (explaining 
that with the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley in 2002 federal law holds accountable the officers 
of the corporations, as they are the ones who really exercise control over corporate decision 
making). 
  54. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 231. 
  55. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 155–56 (9th ed. 2005) (“Under modern corporate 
practice in publicly held corporations, the management function is ordinarily located not in 
the board, but in the executives . . . .”). There are many constraints on the board including 
time, information, composition, and monitoring that make it very difficult for the board of 
directors to control the day-to-day activities of the corporation and thus the burden of 
management shifts to the officers and managers. Id. 
  56. Thompson & Sale, supra note 16, at 906 (explaining that managers of 
corporations technically have fiduciary duties that can be enforced by shareholders, but the 
gap in Delaware’s jurisdictional statutes prevents many lawsuits from being brought in 
Delaware for managers’ breach of fiduciary duty). The problem with the current statute is 
that it does not allow for personal jurisdiction for managers who have allegedly breached 
their fiduciary duties, rather the statute only extends to the directors of the corporation. Id. 
  57. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 439–41. 
  58. Id. 
  59. Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax 
Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 880 (2007). 
  60. Henderson, supra note 24, at 1549–50. 
  61. Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1358 (“A second, more modern 
conception equates shareholder welfare with the trading price of shares. According to this 
view, shareholder wealth maximization is sought directly rather than as a byproduct of 
corporate welfare.”). 
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compensated with equity in the firm and given stock options that allow them to 
capitalize on large increases in a corporation’s stock price over time.62 Senior 
officers may also be compensated with bonuses awarded upon certain increases in 
stock price or earnings or the achievement of other specific goals.63 Shareholders 
can directly affect the value of these grants by exiting the firm if they believe it is 
being managed poorly.64 A mass exodus would cause the stock price to decline and 
so make officers’ stock options worthless. Managers are also motivated to 
maintain their professional reputations.65  
Compensation incentives and the agency cost problem have been 
thoroughly studied,66 and corporations have adopted governance mechanisms that 
realize the best results for the firm and its shareholders when the corporation 
thrives. However, shareholders neither have immediate incentives to pay much 
attention to what is happening within a corporation that is insolvent, nor do they or 
their attorneys have strong incentives to enforce the fiduciary duties they are 
owed.67 If a troubled company’s shareholders are unhappy with its deterioration, 
they will simply sell their shares.68 Enhanced shareholder apathy only increases the 
managerial tendency to be risk-averse and submit to the will of strong creditor 
influence. At some point, the cost of the possibility of losing a position as a senior 
officer at the behest of angry creditors outweighs any potential benefit that 
                                                                                                                
  62. Henderson, supra note 24, at 1549. 
  63. Id. at 1599. 
  64. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 462 (1990) (noting “[t]he traditional Wall Street 
rule—sell out if you dislike management . . . .”). 
  65. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 39, at 921 (exploring the unfortunate 
situation of the former CEO Al Dunlap who followed the theory of running the corporation 
for the sole benefit of the shareholder and was overwhelmingly successful at Scott Paper but 
was unable to achieve the same success at Sunbeam, where the company had to eventually 
file bankruptcy and he was shown the door). 
  66. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 21, at 305–06; Kevin J. Murphy, 
Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 715, 739 (1995). 
Murphy analyzes the problem of executive compensation and ties it to corporate welfare. 
Compensation strategies need lower base salaries with high potential payoffs. Murphy 
predicted firms which utilize a formulaic accounting based bonus system will encourage 
officers to maximize short term profits while firms that utilize incentives such as stock 
options are increasing the incentives for officers to engage in long-term growth of the 
corporation. 
  67. The failure of shareholders and their attorneys to enforce the fiduciary duties 
owed to them in the insolvency context can also be analyzed through the bankruptcy 
context. See David A. Skeel Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994). Skeel writes: 
Because [shareholders] have little financial interest in an insolvent firm, 
and because most or all of any recovery would go to higher priority 
claimants, shareholders lose much of their incentive to promote and 
participate in derivative litigation. To the extent shareholders do play at 
least a minor role in a given suit, they are therefore likely to be 
indifferent (and perhaps even resistant) in the bankruptcy context. 
Id. at 500–01. 
  68. Henderson, supra note 24, at 1558. 
1066 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50:1053 
managers could realize by acting with their incentive compensation in mind and 
trying to take risks that will drive up the price of the company’s stock.69 Creditors 
have a particular advantage over shareholders in influencing management when 
the corporation is within the zone of insolvency. In fact, greater access to corporate 
financial information and a greater ability to use that information may give 
creditors an advantage as soon as strict loan terms are agreed upon by the 
corporation. 
C. Information—The Gateway to the Exercise of Influence 
Disclosure requirements ensure that the market knows more or less what 
a corporation is doing, how it is capitalized, and whether it is headed toward 
financial difficulty.70 The market for information also helps to keep investors and 
the market as a whole apprised of corporations whose managers take irrational 
risks.71 If a shareholder is unhappy with the level of risk a particular company is 
engaging in, she can sell her stock and invest elsewhere. Unfortunately, the 
riskiness of the investments the corporation is making is not always readily 
available to shareholders.72 Shareholders do not always know when management 
may be making significant investment decisions or how they are resolving 
questions that present certain probabilities of success.73 Although it would be very 
inefficient for managers to be forced to disclose this information ex ante, the 
decision itself and its outcome will become well known ex post. For these reasons, 
shareholders are not always in a position to take action that will influence 
managerial decision making ex ante. When they do have sufficient information, 
shareholders have various tools at their disposal to try to influence the direction the 
corporation will take but may not be able to move as swiftly as creditors can in 
response to upcoming managerial decisions.74 
In addition to a more direct path to corporate managers and a unified and 
sophisticated representative, creditors have a significant advantage when it comes 
to corporate information. This is particularly true for private creditors when the 
corporation is in poor financial condition.75 Creditors can build broad definitions 
of situations in which risky decisions may be made into their loan covenants and 
so receive special notice of such situations. This gives an informational advantage 
over and above the one creditors already have in their ability to evaluate, process, 
                                                                                                                
  69. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 
748 (1992). 
  70. See generally Hu, supra note 20, at 367–68. 
  71. Id. at 378–79. 
  72. See id. at 376–77. 
  73. See id. at 378–79; see infra fig.1, at 1080. 
  74. See supra Part I.A. 
  75. See, e.g., Delphi Corp., $2,825,000,000 Five-Year Third Amended and 
Restated Credit Agreement (Form 8-K), at § 6.1 (June 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.secinfo.com/dsvR3.z3nr.d.htm#1stPage [hereinafter Delphi Corp. Loan 
Agreement]; Gen. Motors Corp., 364-Day Revolving Credit Agreement (Form 10-Q), at 
§ 2.17 (Aug. 7, 2007), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dsvR3.u3t4.8.htm#1stPage 
[hereinafter General Motors Loan Agreement]. 
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and act on regular notices about the corporation’s financial well-being. The 
greatest advantage creditors have is in their unified representation and their ability 
to have one sophisticated party review corporate information and act on their 
behalf. The widely dispersed, rationally apathetic shareholders are comparatively 
disadvantaged in their inability to act and negotiate as a cohesive unit. In order to 
achieve balance between shareholder and creditor influences, shareholders should 
take a cue from creditor access to information and their ability to swiftly and 
meaningfully respond to it. Collectively, shareholders may be able to make 
investment decisions that will affect the firm’s stock price and the managers’ 
incentive compensation, but that power pales in comparison to the creditors’ 
ability to replace a senior officer when something is amiss. 
Shareholders have only very limited and indirect means to monitor and 
influence senior officers. While incentive compensation may work well to align 
managerial incentives with the interests of shareholders when a corporation is 
solvent, shareholder influence breaks down as insolvency nears. Further, the 
greater access to information and more sophisticated, unified representation 
creditors can boast gives them a significant advantage over shareholders when the 
corporation is experiencing financial difficulty. 
This Part has explored what the shareholders’ interests are in a 
corporation, what risk preference they would like the corporation to have, and how 
they exert influence on corporate managers. It has also noted that shareholder 
access to timely corporate information and their ability to act on it collectively is 
limited and far surpassed by the means creditors have to act intelligently and in 
concert. Part II of this Article will examine creditor preferences and the tools 
creditors, particularly large institutional creditors, can use to influence corporate 
decision making. It will demonstrate how that creditor power exceeds that 
exercised by shareholders in times of financial difficulty. 
II. CREDITOR PREFERENCES AND INFLUENCE 
Despite all of the attention paid to aligning management interests with 
those of shareholders, managers, particularly those of financially struggling 
companies, often feel strong pressures to make business decisions for the 
corporation that will please its creditors.76 Creditors have no legal right to force 
their judgments upon managers. The loan agreements they enter are with the 
debtor—the corporation—not its management team. Nevertheless, creditors are 
able to exert pressure on senior officers by threatening to declare a default on 
corporate loans, which would send the firm into even more perilous financial 
waters.77 Large institutional lenders can remove managers or install new ones by 
threatening to exercise their rights against the corporation under the loan 
agreement.78 Through the extensive rights many credit agreements grant bank 
                                                                                                                
  76. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1219. 
  77. Id. at 1217. 
  78. Id. at 1244–45 (explaining that creditor control is likely to arise where the 
possibility of loan distress looms over the corporation, and replacing the managers through 
creditor control is the optimal choice for the worried creditors, but not necessarily the best 
option for the corporation). 
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lenders, creditors can exert more direct control over management and the direction 
of the corporation than any other constituent group, even when the corporation is 
solvent. The ability to dictate favorable loan terms and capitalize on the 
advantages afforded them under fraudulent transfer and bankruptcy law 
notwithstanding, creditors have still tried to define their relationship with the 
management of a troubled company as a fiduciary one.79 
This Part will first explain why creditors ultimately cannot rely on 
fiduciary duties to assure management compliance with their decision making 
preferences and why the debate about fiduciary duties owed to creditors does not 
solve the problem this Article addresses. Next it will discuss the powers creditors 
can exercise in bankruptcy. Finally, it will show how some creditors are able to 
reserve powers for themselves before bankruptcy that anticipate the control they 
will share with other creditors should the firm file Chapter 11. 
A. Fiduciary Duties 
In recent years, creditors have tried unsuccessfully to establish the 
existence of a fiduciary duty owed directly to them when a corporation is insolvent 
or within the “zone of insolvency.”80 Creditors have supported their argument in 
favor of fiduciary duties by reasoning that upon a corporation’s insolvency, the 
creditors replace the shareholders as the residual claimants, so they should be the 
beneficiaries of the same fiduciary duties to the corporation that the shareholders 
benefitted from when the corporation was solvent.81 The goal is to justify and even 
legally force business decisions that creditors would prefer: relatively cautious, 
conservative risk-avoiding actions.82 Attempts to punish managers for erroneous 
                                                                                                                
  79. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. Inc. v. Gheewalla, 
930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007); Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. 
Ch. 2004); Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386 (Del. Ch. 1999); Geyer v. 
Ingersoll Publ’n Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
  80. In North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation v. 
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007), the court reestablished the proposition that a 
creditor could never bring a direct suit for breach of fiduciary duties against the directors of 
a solvent corporation in the “zone of insolvency.” The court noted that other rights available 
to creditors include “protection through contractual agreements, fraud and fraudulent 
conveyance law, implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, bankruptcy law, 
general commercial law and other sources of creditor rights.” Id. at 99. In Production 
Resources Group L.L.C. v. NCT Group Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 794 (Del. Ch. 2007), the 
court concluded that if a corporation were insolvent, creditors could sue derivatively 
for breach of fiduciary duties, but, in dicta, acknowledged that although unlikely, the 
possibility of a direct suit for breach of fiduciary duty to creditors may exist. The 
Gheewalla court later clarified the Production Resources holding by explaining that 
direct suits by creditors against the directors of an insolvent corporation for breach of 
fiduciary duty should not be allowed as such an action would create uncertainty for the 
directors in exercising their business judgment, and create conflicts between their duty 
to maximize the value of the corporation and the rights of creditors. Gheewalla, 930 
A.2d at 103. 
  81. See, e.g., Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 92; Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 772; 
Odyssey, 735 A.2d at 386; Geyer, 621 A.2d at 784. 
  82. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 81. 
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but good faith, disinterested decisions have been unsuccessful.83 The business 
judgment rule protects the decision about which party’s interests to favor as long 
as the directors choose the course of action they honestly and rationally believe is 
in the best interests of the corporation.84 Delaware courts have refused to recognize 
a direct cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty to creditors.85 Further, in 
Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court held that creditors may only derivatively 
enforce the fiduciary duties directors owe the corporation and may only do so 
when the corporation is insolvent.86 Various scholars have weighed in on the 
question of fiduciary duties to creditors in the zone of insolvency.87 Though the 
academic debate was long and thorough, the question may have been finally 
resolved by the court in Gheewalla.  
In any event, imposition of fiduciary duties is not the answer to the 
conflict between creditor and shareholder interests this Article seeks to resolve. 
First, as mentioned above, fiduciary duties are most useful in constraining the self-
interested behavior of directors. They are not helpful in devising ways to align the 
incentives of senior officers. Further, the managerial decisions considered here 
would not constitute breaches of fiduciary duty regardless of whether shareholder 
interests or creditor interests are preferred. The goal is to align managerial 
incentives so that senior officers make the business decision that results in the 
greatest wealth maximization for the corporation. The question is how to give 
managers the incentives to make the best decision for the corporation when there is 
no threat that any sort of fiduciary duty would be breached but the manager 
nonetheless faces other pressures from shareholders and creditors urging their 
competing interests. 
Losing the fiduciary duty battle does not leave creditors without 
significant protections or means of influencing managers to honor their preferences 
in corporate decision making. Creditors are able to negotiate directly with the 
corporation and use very specific loan documents that often list detailed 
requirements about how the corporation should be run and what management can 
and cannot do without creditor approval.88 Creditors are also protected by 
fraudulent conveyance laws89 and, of course, by the rights they acquire when a 
corporation is in bankruptcy. 
                                                                                                                
  83. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 81. 
  84. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. 
A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (illustrating the 
difficult business decisions faced by managers and the importance of protecting the 
reasonable and good faith decisions of managers through the business judgment rule). 
  85. Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 776 (holding that creditors of an insolvent 
corporation or a corporation operating in the zone of insolvency could not bring a direct 
action for breach of fiduciary duty against the directors). 
  86. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 103. 
  87. Id. at 99 n.28. 
  88. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1217. 
  89. WILLIAM H. NORTON JR., 3 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2D § 74:5 (2007); 
Steve H. Nickles, Behavioral Effect of New Bankruptcy Law on Management and Lawyers: 
Collage of Recent Statutes and Cases Discouraging Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 59 ARK. L. 
REV. 329, 348–49 (2006). 
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B. Bankruptcy 
Creditors are able to enforce the fiduciary duties directors and officers 
owe to the corporation once the corporation is insolvent or has entered 
bankruptcy.90 While that right simply reflects a shift in the party that has standing 
to enforce the duties owed to the corporation rather than a shift in the beneficiary 
of the right,91 the standing issue is not irrelevant. Creditors are less likely to bring 
an action for breach of fiduciary duty if the decision the managers and directors 
make is one that the creditors support.92 While there is no enhanced legal duty to 
prefer creditor interests when creditors gain the ability to enforce the fiduciary 
duties owed to the corporation, there is certainly a strong disincentive to take 
actions creditors would perceive as compromising their positions or failing to 
maximize the value of the estate for distribution to them. 
The standard justification for giving creditors the ability to enforce the 
fiduciary duties owed the corporation and to exercise enhanced control when a 
corporation enters bankruptcy is that the creditors become the corporation’s 
residual claimants.93 Junior unsecured creditors have replaced equity holders as the 
group that will receive whatever is left over after all other claims are satisfied.94 
For this reason, junior creditors can often assume some of the protections usually 
afforded shareholders, such as bringing derivative actions95 and exercising some 
                                                                                                                
  90. In re Scott Acquisition Corp., 344 B.R. 283, 286 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) 
(finding that under Delaware law, directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to creditors 
when the corporation is insolvent); In re TEU Holdings Inc., 287 B.R. 26, 32–33 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2002) (finding that creditors can sue directors and officers for breach of fiduciary duty 
and in this case the court found that they had breached their duties to the creditors and the 
corporation); Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 787; Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 
784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
  91. Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7, at 545. 
  92. Creditors, for instance, would not have sued the directors for breach of 
fiduciary duty after the company entered bankruptcy as a shareholder did in Agostino v. 
Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110 (Del. Ch. 2004). In this case plaintiffs, shareholders, sued the 
directors directly for breach of fiduciary duty where the company’s restructuring plan called 
for the elimination of the plaintiff’s equity interest without compensation, and holders of the 
company’s notes, i.e. the creditors, were issued new stock. Id. at 1115. In bankruptcy 
meritorious derivative claims can disappear this is called the “black hole effect.” Id. at 1126. 
This effect “exacerbates the incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to underinvest in the 
individual lawsuits in their portfolio.” Id. (citing Skeel, supra note 67, at 500). 
  93. Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7, at 531. 
  94. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). The statute describes the absolute 
priority rule: 
The general principle of the subsection permits confirmation 
notwithstanding nonacceptance by an impaired class if that class and all 
below it in priority are treated according to the absolute priority rule. The 
dissenting class must be paid in full before any junior class may share 
under the plan. If it is paid in full, then junior classes may share. 
Treatment of classes of secured creditors is slightly different because 
they do not fall in the priority ladder, but the principle is the same. 
Id. § 1129 (Historical and Statutory Notes). 
  95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 131 cmt. g 
(2000) (“When an organization such as a business corporation is sued in a derivative action, 
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control over who will manage the firm.96 Creditor control can be particularly 
effective in bankruptcy because the creditors are the main party in interest. They 
are the group paying the most attention to the debtor’s estate and business 
decisions and the most likely to object to decisions or petition the court to cause 
the debtor to pursue a particular cause of action.97 
The committee of unsecured creditors (the “creditors’ committee”) 
appointed by the U.S. Trustee’s office consists of the debtor’s largest creditors and 
can wield considerable power over a company’s reorganization.98 The creditors’ 
committee has statutory power to look over the debtor’s shoulder for the duration 
of the reorganization process.99 It is a direct supervisor of the debtor in possession 
(DIP) and is specifically empowered to move for the appointment of a trustee if the 
debtor’s management abuses its authority or take actions that harm the debtor.100 
Because a majority of the creditors who will not be paid in full must vote to 
confirm a plan of reorganization and the creditors’ committee is supposed to 
represent the interests of all unsecured creditors, a plan of reorganization is 
generally not confirmed without the support of the creditors’ committee.101 The 
creditors’ committee, as a party in interest, has standing to request that the DIP or 
trustee bring an avoidance action against a particular creditor and, if the DIP 
refuses, to bring the suit itself with court permission.102 The ability to act on the 
DIP’s behalf makes the creditors’ committee a force within the debtor’s 
reorganization. In bankruptcy, creditors can therefore exercise even more power 
over the corporation than its shareholders could outside of bankruptcy. Once the 
corporation is insolvent and files for bankruptcy, management practically serves at 
the pleasure of the debtor’s major creditors.103 For all of the formal power placed 
in the creditors’ committee, one creditor or group of creditors can exert more 
practical control over the debtor, and particularly the debtor’s management, than 
                                                                                                                
the organization is ordinarily aligned as an involuntary plaintiff. Persons associated with the 
organization who are accused of breaching a duty to the organization, typically officers and 
directors of the organization, are ordinarily named as defendants. The theory of a derivative 
action is that relief is sought from the individuals for the benefit of the organization.”); 
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 362 (“[A] ‘derivative’ suit is one brought by the shareholders 
on behalf of the corporation. The cause of action belongs to the corporation as an entity . . . . 
The shareholder is merely acting as the firm’s representative.”).  
  96. Henderson, supra note 24, at 1569 (citing Skeel, supra note 24, at 922). 
  97. Creditors can petition the court to ask the DIP or trustee to bring certain 
cause of action on behalf of the estate. Kelli A. Alces, Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary 
Duties in Bankruptcy, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 83, 138–39 (2007). 
  98. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (2006). 
  99. The creditors’ committee may “investigate the acts, conduct, assets, 
liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s business and 
the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other matter relevant to the 
case or to the formulation of a plan.” Id. § 1103(c)(2). 
100. Id. § 1103(c)(4); In re Ionosphere Clubs Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 166 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Eastern Airlines 
established the need for the appointment of a trustee by clear and convincing evidence). 
101. CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 807 (1997). 
102. Ex rel. Cybergenics, 330 F.3d 548, 564 (3d Cir. 2003); DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET 
AL., BANKRUPTCY §§ 2–5(c), 10–13 (1992). 
103. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1236–37. 
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any others. That is the creditor or group of creditors providing the financing that 
the reorganizing corporation needs in order to operate while in bankruptcy. 
In recent years, much has been made of the strict terms creditors insist 
upon, and are granted, when providing DIP financing.104 Because it would be 
difficult to find someone willing to lend (sometimes hundreds of)105 millions of 
dollars to a bankrupt company when a significant portion of those funds will be 
used to administer the bankruptcy case rather than to operate and generate profits 
for the business, the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) authorizes bankruptcy courts 
to allow the debtor to pledge whatever assets and grant whatever priorities are 
necessary to induce the post-petition lender to finance the reorganization.106 The 
Code gives bankruptcy courts the ability to award the DIP lender an administrative 
claim or a claim superior to all other administrative claims, allowing the DIP 
lender to be paid in full before any other unsecured lenders.107 The DIP can also be 
granted liens in all unencumbered property and may even receive a new lien that is 
equal in rights to pre-existing senior liens on debtor property.108 Beyond the formal 
grants to DIP lenders in the Code, DIP lenders negotiate for specific contract terms 
that give them significant control over the debtor’s management. 
David Skeel points to US Airways’ bankruptcy financing as a particularly 
poignant example of management monitoring terms DIP lenders often include.109 
The DIP lender in that case negotiated for the right to fill five of the twelve seats 
on the airline’s board once the company emerged from bankruptcy while only 
taking 37.5% of the company’s post-bankruptcy equity.110 The DIP was able to use 
creditor power and information to make decisions as a shareholder.111 DIP lenders 
also use the terms of the financing agreement to force the DIP management’s hand 
in making business decisions.112 
The extent of creditor control is important because of the change of 
control it effects when the corporation is insolvent or files bankruptcy. 
Shareholders enjoy control while the corporation is healthy; creditors take over 
upon insolvency. Large institutional lenders have been able to reserve a good deal 
                                                                                                                
104. Skeel, supra note 24, at 925–26 (“Lenders have responded to the greater 
importance of post-petition financing and to creditors' concerns about the Chapter 11 
process by using the terms of DIP loans to shape the Chapter 11 case.”). 
105. Id. (giving as an example US Airways’ negotiation to borrow up to $740 
million during the course of reorganization). 
106. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006); Skeel, supra note 24, at 923. 
107. Skeel, supra note 24, at 923. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 925–26. 
110. Id. at 926. 
111. Id. 
112. See In re Source Enters., Inc., No. 06-11707(AJG), 2007 WL 2903954, at 
*17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2007) (confirming the reorganization plan over the objections 
of an unsecured creditor that the DIP relinquished control of the company to the DIP lender 
to the detriment of other creditors); In re Trans World Airlines Inc., No. 01-00056(PJW), 
2001 WL 1820326, at *9 (Bankr. D. Del. April 2, 2001) (approving the proposed financing 
plan over the objections of TWA that the plan included provisions which the corporation 
argued ceded to much control to the DIP lender). 
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of control when the corporation is in the zone of insolvency.113 They achieve most 
of this power during the transition by using particularly onerous loan covenants to 
constrain the decision making of corporate managers so that less than perfectly 
healthy corporations do not take undue risks with creditor funds.114 
C. Loan Covenants 
Loan agreements contain covenants, affirmative and negative, about how 
the debtor should behave during the loan term. The covenants are freely agreed to 
by corporate management, and most are fairly standard in loans of a considerable 
size. They often go beyond requiring that the corporation keep the creditor 
informed and make specific capitalization demands.115 Loan covenants and the 
power they give creditors have the potential not only to change the standard to 
which managers are held, but also to result in an effective change in control.116 
Covenants give creditors leverage to limit the risk of their investment. The 
agreements are set up so that breach of a covenant constitutes an event of default 
that accelerates the payment of the loan. A creditor can threaten to declare a 
default if a covenant is breached and so may extract certain management decisions 
from the debtor with an offer to forego the declaration of default.117 These 
covenants, then, define circumstances under which the creditor can exercise 
indirect control over management. The covenants themselves limit the decisions 
the corporation can make and the significance of risks it can take.118 In many ways, 
they allow creditors to have more power than shareholders would be able to claim. 
This section will explore each of these issues while looking at typical loan 
covenants, as well as those that might be imposed on a riskier loan. 
When loaning significant cash to a corporation, either on a revolving 
basis or as a straight loan of capital, bank creditors require that they be kept 
apprised of the corporation’s financial condition. They typically require annual and 
quarterly financial statements,119 as well as the right to inspect the corporation’s 
property, books, and records and require immediate notice of default, litigation 
against the debtor, or any other event that may have a “material adverse effect” on 
the corporation.120 Debtor corporations are also typically prohibited from incurring 
additional indebtedness, except for loans specifically permitted by the relevant 
                                                                                                                
113. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1250. 
114. Id. at 1216–17. 
115. See Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: 
Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN. 
ECON. 355, 367 (1990). 
116. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1219. 
117. Id. at 1232. 
118. Gilson, supra note 115, at 367. 
119. See, e.g., Delphi Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 75, § 6.1; General 
Motors Loan Agreement, supra note 75, § 5.01; Visteon Corp., Amended and Restated 
Five-Year Revolving Loan Credit Agreement (Form 8-K EX-10.4), § 7.1 (June 30, 2005), 
available at http://www.secinfo.com/dsvR3.z4Z9.a htm#1stPage [hereinafter Visteon Corp. 
Loan Agreement]. 
120. See, e.g., Delphi Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 75, §§ 6.6, 6.7(c); 
General Motors Loan Agreement, supra note 75, §§ 3.01, 3.05; Visteon Corp. Loan 
Agreement, supra note 119, §§ 7.6–7.7. 
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covenant, and from giving additional liens in its present- or after-acquired 
property, with specifically named exceptions.121 Through these positive and 
negative covenants and others like them, the bank creditors take steps to ensure 
that the risk they are taking by loaning money is not unduly increased and that they 
remain aware of the quantity and nature of that risk throughout the life of the loan. 
Events of default, at minimum, are defined as breaches of the loan covenants and 
may result in the acceleration of the loan so that it is immediately due and payable 
in full.122 
In the agreements that accompany particularly risky loans, not only are 
the affirmative and negative covenants more strict, but the events of default are 
more numerous. Because of the loan covenants and events of default, creditors 
may rely less on the skill or trustworthiness of the corporation’s management. The 
banks can simply monitor the corporation’s financial condition and declare a 
default if the position or security they have negotiated for themselves is 
compromised. Because a declaration of default on one loan can result in a 
declaration of default on all loans,123 which will result in the acceleration of all of 
the corporation’s obligations at once, the instant any creditor has the right to 
declare a default, it has the power to drive the corporation into severe financial 
distress, if not insolvency, and can then begin to exert control over the 
corporation.124 The loan covenants creditors add when they are making a loan for a 
risky proposition, loaning a large amount of money to a company in a precarious 
financial position, or restructuring a loan that a corporation needs help honoring, 
include stricter constraints on the actions managers can take while the loan is 
outstanding and also allow the creditor to declare a default as soon as the stability 
the creditor relied upon is threatened. 
As an example, consider Visteon Corporation’s loan agreement with five 
banks entered in 2005, just after it negotiated a bailout of sorts with its former 
parent and largest customer, Ford Motor Company.125 The agreement contains 
                                                                                                                
121. Delphi Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 75, § 7.2; Visteon Corp. Loan 
Agreement, supra note 119, § 7A.2. 
122. Covenant language like this can be found in some loans: 
[I]n each and every case, with the consent of the required banks, the 
administrative agent may, or upon the request of the required banks, the 
administrative agent shall, by notice in writing to the Company, 
terminate the commitments and/or declare the principal of all loans to the 
company and its affiliates and all other amounts owing under the 
Agreement . . . to be due and payable immediately, and upon any such 
declaration the same shall become and shall be immediately due and 
payable, without presentment, demand, protest or other notice of any 
kind, all of which are hereby expressly waived. 
Delphi Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 75, § 8; General Motors Loan 
Agreement, supra note 75, § 7; Visteon Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 119, 
§ 8.1(k). 
123. Another loan covenant that can be found in particularly risky loans requires 
that the corporation continue to pay all of its obligations as agreed. Visteon Corp. Loan 
Agreement, supra note 119, § 7.3; Delphi Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 75, § 6.3. 
124. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1211. 
125. Visteon Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 119, pmbl. 
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affirmative covenants that require Visteon to pay all of its obligations to other 
creditors as agreed,126 to maintain its current lines of business,127 and to give the 
bank group a first lien on any after-acquired property,128 among other things. The 
negative covenants prohibit management from allowing certain debt ratios to 
exceed set quarterly quantities for the remainder of the loan term.129 Other 
covenants limit the amounts of other indebtedness Visteon could incur,130 as well 
as the amount and kind of liens the company could grant in its presently owned or 
after-acquired property.131 Visteon is also prohibited from disposing of its assets 
with few, specific exceptions.132 The negative covenants go on to limit the nature 
and amount of capital expenditures and investments Visteon can make and to 
prohibit the prepayment of loans to other creditors.133 The loan agreement even 
requires that Visteon not maintain any bank accounts with banks other than those 
that make up the bank group granting the loan. Because the banks can exercise a 
right of setoff over any cash they hold in a deposit account for the corporation, 
they are secured to the extent that Visteon holds cash in a bank account so long as 
that account is held by a member of the bank group.134 All of these loan covenants 
carefully and specifically detail what management may and may not do with the 
corporation’s assets and how it should manage its investments. They fix the levels 
of risk the corporation can assume and the extent of its capitalization in ways 
shareholders cannot. Creditors achieve this sort of power over the corporation 
through their ability to declare a default on the loan. The events of default can 
grow more numerous and specific in a particularly risky loan. 
Common events of default include the failure to make principal or interest 
payments on the loan, a judgment of a certain size entered against the corporation 
that is not quickly vacated, discharged, satisfied, or stayed pending appeal, and the 
                                                                                                                
126. Id. § 7.3. 
127. Id. § 7.4. 
128. Id. § 7.9(a). 
129. Id. § 7A.1. 
130. Id. § 7A.2 (explaining that the corporation cannot “[c]reate, incur, assume, 
become liable in respect of or suffer to exist any [i]ndebtedness, except . . . [what has 
already been agreed to]”). 
131. Id. § 7A.3. 
132. See, e.g., id. § 7A.5(a)−(i) (“[T]he [d]isposition of obsolete or worn out 
property in the ordinary course of business, the sale of inventory in the ordinary course of 
business . . . the sale or issuance of any Subsidiary’s Capital Stock to the [c]ompany or 
[s]ubsidiary [g]uarantor . . . .”). This is an example of an exception. 
133. Id. §§ 7A.7−A.9. 
134. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 102, §§ 6-38, 6-39, at 360–64. Equitable setoff is 
a creditor’s remedy. Both parties are both a creditor and a debtor to each other. The remedy 
is most commonly used by banks. The depositor of the bank is also a borrower. The bank is 
then a creditor and a debtor at the same time. The two parties are thus indebted to each other 
and “[s]etoff thus allows the bank to apply the borrower’s deposit account to reduce the 
borrower’s obligation to the bank.” In bankruptcy proceedings under 11 U.S.C § 553 a 
setoff right exercised prior to the bankruptcy case cannot normally be avoided, thus the right 
of setoff survives bankruptcy. Furthermore, “a creditor’s right of setoff [is] a form of 
collateral or security so that the creditor’s claim against the debtor is treated like a secured 
claim.” Id. 
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voluntary or involuntary filing of a bankruptcy petition.135 Visteon also defaults on 
its loan if a change in control occurs.136 This is a slightly more unusual provision 
that gives creditors a level of control over and a voice in matters of corporate 
governance about which they are usually powerless. The creditors probably do not 
plan to use this provision as a means of actually declaring a default after a change 
in control occurs, of course. The provision gives the corporation’s management a 
takeover defense in the creditors’ favor. That is, any entity interested in purchasing 
control of the debtor must pay off the creditors’ loans in full or negotiate with the 
creditors directly about whether and how it can assume the obligations. Such a 
provision gives the creditors a seat at the table in any takeover negotiations. Aside 
from their use of loan covenants and the power to declare defaults to control the 
debtor corporation and its management, institutional creditors routinely prohibit 
management from taking actions that would have a “material adverse effect” on 
the corporation’s status quo. 
A “material adverse effect” is commonly defined as one that affects “the 
financial condition of the Borrower and its Subsidiaries taken as a whole or 
 . . . the validity or enforceability of this Agreement and any of the other Loan 
Documents or the rights or remedies of the . . . Lenders under the Loan 
Documents.”137 Creditors are able to use the “material adverse effect” principle to 
change the standard of management behavior by directly prohibiting managers 
from causing the corporation to take any action that would result in a material 
adverse effect or change in the debtor’s circumstances. The requirement is often 
phrased more as a permissive exception. For instance, Visteon must continue to 
engage in its current lines of business, preserve and maintain its corporate 
existence, and “take all reasonable action to maintain all rights, privileges and 
franchises necessary or desirable in the normal conduct of its business . . . except 
 . . . to the extent that failure to do so could not reasonably be expected to have a 
Material Adverse Effect.”138 This “first, do no harm” admonition appears 
throughout the negative covenants in the loan agreement. While at first it may 
seem to give managers more discretion within the agreement—managers can 
ignore certain requirements and prohibitions if they reasonably expect that doing 
                                                                                                                
135. Delphi Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 75, § 8; General Motors Loan 
Agreement, supra note 75, § 7; Visteon Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 119, §§ 8.1−8.2. 
136. Visteon Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 119, § 8.1(k). Despite the default 
provisions pertaining to the change of control some firms have given banks “a special class 
of equity security that guarantees them control over a minimum number of board seats.” 
These provisions can lead to “direct lender representation on the board of directors.” Gilson, 
supra note 114, at 365. 
137. General Motors Loan Agreement, supra note 75, § 1; See Gilson, supra note 
115, at 362 (explaining that when default occurs there is a transfer of the firm’s assets to the 
creditors. Bank lenders have significant control over resource allocation in distressed firms 
through two sources: “(i) explicit stock ownership and representation on the board of 
directors and (ii) restrictions on corporate financing and investment policy contained in the 
firm’s debt covenants.”). Some agreements contain exceptions for the events disclosed in 
certain federally mandated filings and shareholder litigation arising there from, but reserve 
the right to consider any resulting condition or circumstance when determining whether a 
material adverse affect has occurred in the future. 
138. Visteon Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 119, § 7.4. 
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so will not harm the corporation’s financial standing or compromise the creditors’ 
rights—it significantly lowers the standard for challenging managerial discretion 
that would otherwise apply. Under these “material adverse effect” terms, managers 
must act on reasonable expectations that are much easier to second guess and 
undermine than the business judgment rule’s standard of rationally or honestly 
believing a decision to be in the best interests of the corporation.139 Corporate law 
has long avoided imposing a reasonableness standard on decisions made by 
corporate managers.140 In these loan agreements, the creditors suggest a course of 
conduct that they think will insure that the corporation is very likely to be able to 
meet its obligations to the creditors. If those suggestions are ignored, then the 
course chosen must be one that the managers can reasonably expect not to cause 
harm to the corporation’s financial health or continued existence. If the managers 
make a decision that does end up harming the corporation, then the creditors will 
have a credible reason to challenge it as unreasonable and declare a default for the 
breach of a covenant. The “material adverse effect” language is, therefore, yet 
another way creditors can directly, though subtly, exercise control over the 
decisions corporate managers make on behalf of the firm. 
This combination of control mechanisms gives creditors more implicit 
power over corporate management, particularly when the corporation is in a bad 
financial position, than they could explicitly reserve or exert and more power than 
shareholders are legally entitled to exercise. Shareholders may not make business 
decisions for a corporation. They may not remove officers, and they can remove 
directors only through shareholder elections.141 Shareholders have no expedient 
means to hold managers directly accountable for decisions they make that harm the 
corporation or compromise the nature of the risk the shareholders are taking with 
their investment. The best shareholders can do is rely on a compensation system 
that gives managers incentives to increase shareholder value and disincentives to 
compromise it. A corporation’s large bank creditors are able to exercise more 
oversight than shareholders can, or will be motivated to exercise, when a 
corporation is in trouble. They are able to dictate particular decisions management 
will make and can quickly and effectively punish management in ways 
shareholders never could because of the rights they reserve for themselves in loan 
agreements. Furthermore, when these creditors take corporate stock as collateral 
for the loans they make, a default on the loan can effect a change in control 
without shareholders’ ever voting to approve the change or receiving the payment 
of a control premium that usually accompanies corporate takeovers.142 Large, 
institutional creditors really are able to exercise a kind of direct control over a 
                                                                                                                
139. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). 
140. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 n.16 (Del. Ch. 
1996). 
141. 1 JAMES D. COX ET AL., COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING 
UNINCORPORATED FORMS OF DOING BUSINESS § 9.12 (2d ed. 2003). 
142. See, e.g., Odyssey Partners v. Fleming Co., No. C.A. 14770, 1998 WL 
155543 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 1998); Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 
(Del. Ch. 1997). Theoretically, the shareholders are not left uncompensated. The 
corporation realizes a benefit from using its stock as collateral for the loan because it will 
pay a lower interest rate for the loan as a consequence of providing corporate control as 
collateral. 
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corporation’s management when a corporation poses a significant risk of default 
that shareholders cannot exercise even when the corporation is healthy. That power 
significantly influences managerial discretion and thereby intensifies the risk 
aversion that is typical of corporate management. This level of creditor control 
threatens to undermine the independent managerial decision making upon which 
corporate governance law is built.  
Having examined the powers creditors have over management both when 
the corporation is solvent and when it is not, this Article will now turn to the effect 
the mere prospect of creditor control can have on corporate investment decisions 
when the company is still solvent. 
III. HOW CREDITOR INFLUENCE BLEEDS INTO SOLVENT TIME 
(THE UNRAVELING PROBLEM) 
Creditor control in times of default, insolvency, and bankruptcy is 
relevant to the pre-insolvency struggle between shareholders and creditors because 
the power creditors can wield upon default affects managerial decisions well 
before those powers are realized. It is the specter of those consequences that 
weighs on management when deciding whether to cause the corporation to take a 
particular business risk.143 While the threat of creditor control over the corporation 
becomes a more real and immediate concern when the corporation faces financial 
difficulty or is at risk of breaching a loan covenant or of defaulting on a major 
loan, the specter of creditor control always looms over the decisions a responsible 
manager will make on behalf of the company.144 Hu and Westbrook warn that 
recognizing a fiduciary duty to creditors before bankruptcy would result in 
directors who “avoid the entrepreneurial risk taking crucial to our country’s global 
competitiveness.”145 They understate the point. Creditors have already reserved for 
themselves the kind of control that will assure risk aversion in managers when a 
corporation is less than completely financially stable. The ability to enforce direct 
breaches of fiduciary duty would indeed discourage value-maximizing decision 
making, but creditor control in the zone of insolvency is a more direct route to the 
same result. This Part will show how the creditor power reserved in loan 
agreements can affect even the decisions of solvent firms and how management 
                                                                                                                
143. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1225–27. Baird and Rasmussen use 
Warnaco Corporation as an example of the amount of control that creditors can have over a 
solvent corporation. Warnaco was in the Fortune 1000 but invested unsuccessfully in the 
1990s in Calvin Klein Jean Outlets. The company had to borrow to continue to operate and 
increased its debt from $500 million to $1.5 billion. The shift in control from the 
shareholders to creditors occurred at this time. The CEO was replaced even though the 
company remained solvent. Warnaco was no longer able to borrow on an unsecured basis 
and could only continue to operate with the permission of the institutional lenders. The 
incentives to engage in risky transactions disappeared. “The presence of such an 
institutional lender fundamentally alters corporate governance. The lending agreement 
contains many affirmative and negative covenants that give the lender de facto control over 
every aspect of the business.” Id. at 1227. 
144. Id. at 1227–28. 
145. Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1328. 
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loyalties will shift to creditor interests in advance of default or insolvency when 
creditor and shareholder preferences are at odds. 
To appreciate how creditor power accumulates as the corporation faces a 
greater likelihood of financial difficulty, suppose a firm (“Firm”) is a large, 
publicly held company and has had some financial difficulties but remains solvent. 
Firm owes its Bank Group $250 million on a revolving credit facility. The assets 
securing the facility are worth $175 million, including cash collateral, so the Bank 
Group is undersecured by $75 million. Firm has two investment options. Option A 
is a safe bet. It has a 100% chance of earning a $76 million return. Option B is a 
riskier proposition but carries a potential return of $150 million. Management 
faces a difficult decision when choosing between the two because it will be in 
default if the loan remains undersecured at the end of the next fiscal quarter. As 
explained above, a default could be catastrophic because it would cause the 
corporation to default on its other credit obligations and Firm would certainly be 
insolvent if it were forced to pay all of its obligations in full. The Bank Group is 
therefore strongly urging Firm’s management to pursue Option A. It has made 
clear that if the management team chooses Option B and the venture fails, then 
Bank Group will only refrain from declaring a default if the directors agree to 
install senior officers of the Bank Group’s choosing. Senior managers face a 
possible job loss if they take the action disfavored by the Bank Group and may 
face similar, though less focused and therefore less powerful, unrest from 
shareholders if they do not pursue the opportunity to make $150 million with 
Option B. What probability of success or failure must Option B present to sway 
the managers in one way or another? Modeling the strategic decision, or game, and 
finding the indifference point provides an answer.146 
The managers act first. They choose either Option A or Option B. If they 
choose Option A, the Bank Group will be happy and will not take further action. 
The shareholders will then have to decide whether to treat the managers well or 
treat them poorly. Because the shareholders can only act through their election of 
the board of directors to change management, they are not able to as directly exert 
their will over individual managers. Still, shareholder voting and monitoring has 
become increasingly relevant in recent years as shareholders have adopted various 
methods to form influential blocks.147 Although indirect, shareholder power over 
management cannot be dismissed out of hand; poor treatment by shareholders can 
exact a cost senior management cannot discount.148 More directly, angry 
shareholders can exit the firm, thereby making equity compensation for managers 
                                                                                                                
146. Special thanks to Professor Jonathan Klick for his help in modeling this 
hypothetical. The basic facts of the hypothetical come from the kind of problem considered 
by Chancellor Allen in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications 
Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) which is 
based on the facts in In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987). 
147. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting 
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 820–21 (2006). 
148. See Polsky, supra note 59, at 888–89 n.59 (citing Melvin A. Eisenberg & 
Brett H. McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the Theory of Overreliance, 54 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1335, 1366 n.36 (2003)). 
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significantly less valuable and making the firm more susceptible to takeover.149 
Because equity compensation accounts for a large portion of senior officer 
compensation these days, the cost of such shareholder “punishment” may be 
significant.150 A job the manager originally valued at $3 million, in the event of 
mass shareholder exit, might only be worth $1 million. Alternatively, if the senior 
managers choose Option B, the success of the investment will determine which 
party will respond to their choice as well as what the likely reaction will be. The 
probability of Option B’s success is therefore an important determinant of how 
strongly managers will be influenced by the consequences of its failure, that is, the 
punishment threatened by the Bank Group. Here is a diagram of the game which 
includes payoffs to be discussed further below: 
 
Figure 1 
Option B      Manager  Option A   
      
 
 
                         Nature         Shareholders 
            
                         Treat Well               Treat Poorly 
 
                      PS                PF 
              (3, .5, 75)            (1, 1, 75) 
 
                 Shareholders           Creditors  
                                                               
           Treat Well             Treat Poorly    Treat Well            Treat Poorly 
 
                (4, 75, 75)    (0, 72, 75)               (3, 0, -76)        (-2, 0, -74) 
 
Key: 
Payoffs: (Directors, Shareholders, Creditors)    
PS: Probability of Success 
PF: Probability of Failure 
                                                                                                                
149. Henderson, supra note 24, at 1558–61. 
150. Id. at 1548–50, 1553–55. 
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It is true that shareholders would prefer Option A if Option B had a poor 
chance of success. But, given the large payoff associated with Option B, Option B 
would have to have a chance of failure greater than 98% before its expected value 
would be less than the $1 million in equity left over after the creditors are satisfied 
under Option A.151 Rational, well-diversified shareholders would be willing to see 
the corporation take a significant risk in order to try to obtain the $150 million 
payoff possible under Option B, so they will have an incentive to punish 
management for not taking the risk if the likelihood of failure is somewhat less 
than 98%. Of course, a risk preference that extreme does not comport with the 
objective of corporate wealth maximization either. Balance between shareholder 
and creditor interests should be the goal. 
Now consider the expected outcomes given the result of Option B. If 
Option B is successful, again, the creditors will not take any action, but this time 
the shareholders will be very pleased. The manager will keep his job, which, for 
the sake of comparing payoffs, I am valuing at $3 million, and receive a bonus of 
$1 million as a reward for the increase in the value of the company due to his 
savvy investing on its behalf. Because the shareholders realize a benefit in 
enhanced corporate value and thus enhanced stock price, they benefit from treating 
the manager who has enhanced the value of their investment well. If Option B 
fails, the company will most likely be pushed into insolvency by a declaration of 
default or will have to adopt whatever changes the Bank Group insists upon to 
avoid such a declaration. In that case, the creditors act. They are now 
undersecured, and therefore have lost the $75 million collateral that would have 
been available had the company chosen Option A. If they decide to treat 
management well, they will not only lose the collateral they counted on, but they 
will be the creditors of a company with management that is willing to take 
imprudent risks with their money. This effectively makes the loan more expensive 
and so the creditors suffer a loss if they fail to take any action against the 
managers. Under these circumstances, the creditors will act to install managers that 
will be more careful with loan proceeds and better protect the creditors’ position 
within the firm. The manager who has decided not to honor creditor preferences 
will not only be replaced, but his reputation on the job market will be diminished 
and he will have to waste six months of his career assisting the turnaround 
specialist the creditors will have the right to appoint before he can move on to his 
next position. This accounts for the additional $2 million “cost” of punishment to 
the manager. 
What decision should Firm’s management make? To which preferences 
will they be more sympathetic? The answers to those questions depend on the 
likelihood of Option B’s failure. Likelihood of failure equals likelihood of default 
here, because if Option B fails, the creditors will be able to declare a default. By 
considering this simple example, we can see how likely default has to be in a given 
situation for managers to begin to weigh more heavily creditor preferences and 
concerns over the investment ambitions of shareholders. This is done by finding 
                                                                                                                
151. Shareholders would realize $75 million in value after the creditors are paid 
under Option B. The expected value of Option B with a probability of success of 2% is $1.5 
million. ($75 million)(.02)=$1.5 million. 
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the indifference point, the point at which a manager is indifferent between Option 
A and Option B given his own payoffs. By setting the payoffs on each side equal 
to each other and solving for the probability of losing with Option B, we find that 
the manager is indifferent as between the two courses of action when it is 50% 
likely that Option B will fail.152 Stated more generally, when there is greater than a 
50% chance that Firm will default on its loans from the Bank Group, the managers 
will weight the Bank Group’s preferences more heavily. We now have decidedly 
risk-averse managers. 
This indifference point can be manipulated upward by increasing the 
payoff for managers for a successful Option B, or by strengthening the penalty 
shareholders can or will impose if Option A is chosen. It can be manipulated 
downward by creditors if they are able to impose a greater reputation cost on 
managers for being removed at the behest of concerned creditors.153 Some 
managers may consider the loss of their job at the hands of displeased creditors to 
be a greater cost or punishment than the $5 million supposed in the diagram above. 
A manager for whom that circumstance would mean a loss of $6 million would 
take the course of action preferred by creditors when the chance of default was 
only 43%.154 Managers may make the mistake of assigning too great a value to this 
result and so may be more risk averse than even their own personal circumstances 
require. Fiduciary duties doctrine would prevent managers from taking bonus 
payments or rewards from creditors, and creditors cannot contract directly with 
managers for loyalty or decisions made in their favor. While their methods of 
affecting managers are indirect (as are shareholders’, for that matter), they are not 
ineffective. 
Shareholders can also adjust rewards to managers for favorable decisions 
and the severity of the punishments they impose. An equity trustee, described in 
more detail in Part V, infra, can help make shareholder punishment of managers 
more likely and less expensive to accomplish. In the example considered in this 
section, the shareholders exited the firm and punished the managers through a 
decline in the valuation of incentive compensation. This is a much easier and more 
efficient alternative to removing managers by lobbying or threatening the board. If 
Firm had had an equity trustee serving as a shareholder representative, that equity 
trustee’s duties would have begun with the negotiation of the loan from the Bank 
Group. An equity trustee privy to all information the creditors would have had 
could have informed the shareholders of the upcoming choice and may have made 
it easier for the shareholders to register their preferences with the board. More 
importantly, a shareholder representative such as an equity trustee could have led 
                                                                                                                
152. The algebra follows: 
 1 = 4(1-PF)-2PF 
 1 = 4-4PF-2PF 
 -3 = -6PF 
 1/2 = PF 
153. This is the greatest cost managers face when removed or replaced in their 
position or authority by displeased creditors. The cost can be considerable. Baird & 
Rasmussen, supra note 39, at 935, 938–39. 
154. -3 = -7PF 
 3/7 = PF 
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to negotiation of less onerous loan covenants. The equity trustee still would not 
make any decisions for management, and the actual powers to which shareholders 
are legally entitled would not change. Rather, the equity trustee would increase the 
power of the shareholders relative to the power of creditors, so that the balance 
would not tip so far in the creditors’ favor when the corporation is in a difficult 
financial position. If the creditors retained the ability more credibly to threaten a 
more severe punishment for managers, then the indifference point would move to a 
relatively lower probability of default and so keep managers more risk-preferring 
for more of the corporation’s solvent time. 
Larger creditors that have loaned significant amounts of cash to a 
business have incentives to invest more time and resources in remaining well 
informed about the business’s financial condition. They are also able to exercise 
more influence, if not outright control, over the business decisions the corporation 
makes because of the terms they insist upon in loan agreements.155 Creditors have 
no incentives to take risks that jeopardize their goal to be repaid in full with 
interest because they do not receive any upside from the business’ success. 
Shareholders, on the other hand, care only about the prospect of returns above and 
beyond what creditors are owed, and if those risky investments fail, they are no 
worse off than they would have been if the corporation only had enough to repay 
its creditors.156 Shareholder and creditor risk preferences are therefore very 
different, and the results of those differences can make some decisions difficult for 
management. Too much pressure from either side may push managers to make 
decisions that are not value-maximizing. Part IV will demonstrate how dominance 
by either shareholder or creditor preferences will not necessarily lead to corporate 
wealth maximization. Instead, balanced influence and managerial independence is 
essential. 
IV. THE STRUGGLE—DIFFICULT DECISIONS FOR MANAGEMENT, 
FINDING THE OPTIMAL PATH 
The constant struggle between shareholder and creditor interests and 
preferences is magnified when a corporation is in a perilous financial position 
where resources may be scarce. Sometimes shareholder preferences dominate and 
sometimes they go too far, particularly when control is concentrated in a few 
dominant owners.157 Other times, creditor risk aversion is the primary influence on 
management. There is often a noticeable lack of balance in one direction or the 
other, and that imbalance will not necessarily lead to the decision most likely to 
maximize corporate wealth. Shareholders often lack the detailed monitoring 
abilities creditors can reserve for themselves and therefore may not fully 
appreciate a corporation’s financial position and the choices management faces.158 
Creditor power, when reserved and exercised, is not necessarily reviewed or 
constrained, and shareholders might not even try to prevent it at the time it is 
                                                                                                                
155. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1211–17. 
156. This point is made clearly and famously by Chancellor Allen. Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 
277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
157. See id. 
158. Henderson, supra note 24, at 1558–61, 1565–66. 
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granted. As the struggle over limited resources intensifies, managers face difficult 
choices, not only about which group’s interests to prefer, but also about what 
choice is best for the corporate enterprise. The decision that may have the greatest 
hope of wealth maximization for the corporation may not necessarily be one the 
creditors or shareholders would choose if they had the choice. 
Agency costs may generally be lower for a financially distressed 
company than a healthy one because of the enhanced supervision provided by 
creditors and vulture investors.159 Indeed, agency costs may be lower due to a 
lessened concern that managers could loot the company at this sensitive time. Still, 
the agency cost caused by the struggle between shareholder and creditor interests 
in the zone of insolvency is that managers will lose sight of the goal of wealth 
maximization in favor of extreme risk aversion that will allow them to enjoy other 
personal benefits such as the ability to retain their position with the company and 
preserve their professional reputations. They might not steal or engage in self-
dealing, but that does not guarantee that they will make the best decisions for the 
firm. 
First, this Part will evaluate the decision to enter into a loan with strict 
covenants or numerous possible events of default. Shareholder interests are cast 
aside during the negotiation of such loans when planning for the possibility of 
financial distress, and such negotiations would serve as an important trigger for the 
use of an equity trustee to insure that a shareholder voice remains if the company 
endures financial distress under the terms of the loan. Next, I will turn to the role 
of market forces in evaluating this problem and argue that the fact that the market 
has not responded to this problem does not mean that it does not exist. Finally, I 
will model an investment decision to show why a balance of shareholder and 
creditor interests, and absolute dominance by neither, is the best way to ensure that 
managers have the independence to make the best business decision for the firm. 
A. Loan Terms—Business Judgment and Business Risk 
Entering into the loan agreements that give bank creditors significant 
power over the corporation through loan covenants and default terms is a business 
decision, and a business risk in and of itself. This Article has focused so far on the 
behavior and decision making of managers after a risky loan has been undertaken, 
as those managers struggle with the resulting balance of power among the 
corporate constituents when deciding how to operate a troubled company. Before 
we can determine with certainty whether the position in which managers find 
themselves after agreeing to various loan covenants is a bad one for shareholders 
or the corporation, we must first examine the decision to enter into a particular 
loan agreement in the first place. When the money is borrowed, the managers may 
be making a choice to expand the corporation, even if it is experiencing financial 
difficulty, rather than making the more risk-averse decision to try to cut costs 
while carefully continuing to operate the current business.160 At first glance, it may 
seem that this system has achieved an optimal balance. After all, if the managers 
try to take corporate risks and those risks are unsuccessful, the corporation, its 
                                                                                                                
159. Id. at 1544. 
160. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 69, at 748–49. 
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shareholders, and management have had their chance and lost, and now the 
creditors should be able to do whatever they must to recover the loan made to the 
company. Some version of this “balance” may be appropriate, but, upon closer 
examination, it becomes clear that the current practice does not necessarily lead to 
corporate wealth maximization. 
Corporate law and practice usually welcome outcomes that result from 
informed bargaining. In the circumstances considered above, the corporation was 
in financial trouble and the managers decided to borrow cash to take a business 
risk anyway. If the risky investment were unsuccessful, the corporation would 
become insolvent. At the time of the loan, neither the managers nor the 
shareholders wanted the creditor powers to ripen. Both groups remained hopeful 
that the investment would produce a substantial return and crisis would be averted. 
Nevertheless, all of the relevant parties knew creditor control was a realistic 
possibility under the loan agreement and accepted it as an additional cost of the 
loan, in lieu of a higher interest rate, and an additional cost of failure. Indeed, if we 
put loan terms to a shareholder vote, the loan agreement might be approved. Such 
covenants are the price corporations pay to have the funds with which to take 
investment risks. Managers and shareholders alike assume that the current 
shareholders will exit if the investment fails and creditor control becomes a 
reality.161 Both groups lack incentives to provide for shareholder rights and 
preferences upon financial failure because both assume that the current 
shareholders will be gone. The circumstances of financial distress and creditor 
control, rather than insolvency or bankruptcy, may be the endgame for which 
shareholders and their managerial “agents” should plan. 
B. Market Forces 
There is certainly a valid argument that the market can and would work to 
limit creditor power in times of financial distress if it were really a problem. 
Significant loan agreements are attached as exhibits to the public disclosures of 
large, publicly traded companies. Shareholders in these companies are thereby 
informed of the terms under which the corporation has borrowed and are free to 
exercise their market power to show their disapproval of credit terms by selling 
their stock. If such loan covenants really are harmful to shareholder or corporate 
profits, the market will value shares in victim companies less, and managers and 
creditors alike will stop favoring such terms. If they thought they needed to, 
corporations would plan ahead for troubled times and consider how managers 
should make decisions when the corporation nears insolvency. Shareholders, 
through the corporation, could then find ways to push managers to act in a certain 
way when the corporation is in trouble through the compensation packages and 
employment terms offered the managers. Instead, strict loan covenants prevail and 
serve as the only real guidelines for corporate decision making in the zone of 
insolvency. 
Strict loan covenants may confer advantages on both the corporation and 
its shareholders. First, they reduce the cost of credit needed to continue the 
business or undertake a potentially risky investment. Second, everyone can benefit 
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from, or free ride on, the additional supervision of management that the creditors 
provide.162 Finally, corporations may have to accept these terms in order to take 
the risks shareholders would want them to take. Alternatives the creditors may 
prefer, such as not making a particular investment at a particular time, or passing 
on an investment opportunity with a certain risk of loss, or using available cash to 
pay off debts rather than make further corporate investments, may be rejected in 
favor of a more aggressive approach if the creditors are assured they will be able to 
recoup their investment in the event the corporation falls to a particular level of 
financial distress. In a hypothetical shareholder vote, shareholders may willingly 
agree to seemingly onerous credit terms in exchange for an opportunity to make a 
potentially lucrative corporate investment. Loan covenants and implicit creditor 
control are simply costs of much needed credit; indeed, they are costs of the credit 
that enables corporations to make risk-seeking investments. While one might think 
this is good news for shareholders, a closer examination reveals otherwise. 
Shareholder acquiescence in the negotiation of strict loan covenants 
should not be mistaken for a signal that such covenants result in the maximization 
of corporate or shareholder profits. Rather, such silence on the part of shareholders 
simply reflects the decline of shareholder powers and value in the zone of 
insolvency; as a result, shareholders have very little incentive to guard their ability 
to influence management in times of financial distress.163 Individual shareholders 
may find it more efficient to simply exit a failing firm. Investors buying the shares 
of exiting shareholders may be those “vulture investors” known for investing in 
struggling companies to turn a short-term gain. Those interests may not be in line 
with the goal of long-term corporate wealth maximization. 
Even if shareholders do have the proper incentives to resist strict loan 
covenants, managers are not breaching their duties to shareholders or the 
corporation by entering into the loan agreements discussed here. Because no duty 
is breached, shareholders have very few tools at their disposal to object.164 The 
least expensive means available to shareholders for expressing disapproval of a 
corporate action is the sale of the corporation’s stock.165 The threat posed by 
shareholder exit is much less meaningful in a financially distressed company when 
the stock price is already depressed. Then, the stock price might already have 
fallen so that the officers are effectively punished with the loss or devaluation of 
incentive compensation, whether or not the poor financial condition is their doing. 
While the appropriate message of shareholder disapproval may be sent by the 
decline in stock price, the decline in price could also result from the decreased 
value of the firm. Any angry shareholder exit may be masked by the decrease in 
value of the corporation that originally caused the shareholder ire. At this point in 
the corporation’s life, as the law now stands, the shareholders really are 
                                                                                                                
162. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1250. 
163. Skeel, supra note 67, at 501; Henderson, supra note 24, at 1558. 
164. Even if shareholders would otherwise be tempted to bring derivative suits 
against corporate directors on account of the loan terms or the effects of the loan agreements 
in times of financial trouble, the shareholders, and, most importantly, their attorneys, are 
less likely to pursue the derivative remedy in the zone of insolvency. Skeel, supra note 67, 
at 501; Alces, supra note 97, at 122–23. 
165. Henderson, supra note 24, at 1558. 
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powerless.166 For all of these reasons, the simple fact that shareholders have not 
vocally and meaningfully objected to or prevented the adoption of loan terms 
should not serve as dispositive evidence that such terms are in the shareholders’ or 
the corporation’s best interests. Rather, it means that all of the relevant parties 
assume the current shareholders will have exited by the time strict loan covenants 
become effective, and so there is no need to protect equity interests as they may 
exist upon that eventuality. No one will likely complain when the loan agreement 
is negotiated, and it is too late to complain once the corporation is in financial 
distress. 
The chief problem caused by strong creditor control is the undermining of 
managerial independence that occurs when any one group can exercise significant 
control over managerial decision making. Shareholders should want to object to 
loan terms that implicitly or explicitly give creditors more power over the 
corporation than shareholders would be allowed to claim under state law. The 
prevalence of such loan covenants effectively wrests control of the corporation 
from shareholders before insolvency, and, certainly before bankruptcy. This 
constrains managers to act to the advantage of creditors in a way shareholders 
could never pressure managers to act. While the tools used by each constituency 
must necessarily be different,167 they need not and should not be unequal in their 
ability to reach management and their obligation to honor the independence of 
managerial business judgment. It is only with the appropriate balances between 
supervision and managerial independence and between shareholder authority and 
creditor power that management will be free and encouraged to make the decisions 
most likely to lead to corporate wealth maximization. Only then will the 
appropriate level of risk be preferred. 
Professor Barry Adler makes the point that companies that have reached 
the end of the line and are abject failures would do better to liquidate than to 
engage in a long, expensive reorganization process.168 Such “dead” companies 
should liquidate, individually, sooner and, collectively, more often.169 But, if a 
corporation still has long term prospects, still has a viable and potentially 
profitable business model, and still could reasonably exist in a competitive market, 
then the risk aversion that leads to the decision to cut the company’s losses and 
either liquidate or file for bankruptcy is not necessarily the optimal level of risk 
preference.170 Corporations that seek large cash loans either to continue to operate 
or to pursue new opportunities in the hopes of turning the business around may 
still have life and should not necessarily be governed by the degree of risk aversion 
creditors would prefer. The same can be said of companies that renegotiate loans, 
                                                                                                                
166. This is another extension of the “vestigialization” principle introduced by 
Skeel, which explains that state law corporate governance is ineffective for insolvent 
corporations because state law was not built to address the problems and circumstances that 
confront financially distressed companies. Skeel, supra note 67, at 489–92. 
167. Creditors could not, for example, offer managers incentive compensation 
through shares in the corporation’s debt, at least not before bankruptcy. 
168. Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment 
Incentives, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 597 (1995). 
169. Id. 
170. Skeel, supra note 24, at 937–38. 
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agreeing to be bound by stricter covenants, in the hopes of reorganizing their debt 
outside of bankruptcy. Such companies with long-term prospects and reasonable 
hopes for profitability should still be taking more risks than creditors would 
approve under cautious loan agreements. As long as a corporation is “alive,” 
meaning financially viable, its risk preferences should tend more to risk-seeking 
behavior than the absolute risk aversion that results from the combined risk 
aversion of creditors and individual managers when a corporation faces financial 
difficulty. Equity preferences still pertain, because it is still possible that an equity 
position will exist in the future. Managers should still try to maximize corporate 
wealth, above and beyond the company’s debt load, as long as the firm is not 
liquidating with the sole objective of repaying creditors. Corporations may bounce 
in and out of the zone of insolvency a few times without ever liquidating or 
entering bankruptcy.171 Shutting down wealth-maximizing behaviors and risk 
preferences may leave money on the table. 
Too strong a risk preference would not be prudent either. Some caution 
during troubled times is warranted lest the corporation’s reasonable hopes for 
recovery and profitability be dashed. The goal is not to allow shareholder 
preferences to grow in influence so as to overwhelm completely the risk aversion 
of managers and creditors. Rather, it is to balance constituent powers of influence 
so that neither can completely assert its will upon managers, thereby preserving 
managerial independence to pursue corporate wealth maximization subject only to 
removal by the board of directors. 
C. Business Decisions in the Zone—The Cost of Lost Managerial Independence 
Dominance by either shareholders or creditors when a corporation is in 
financial trouble may deprive managers of the independence they need to make the 
best investment decision for the corporation’s financial future and wealth 
maximization. With Figure 1172 and its illustration of shareholder and creditor 
preferences and influence each group can exert on managerial decision making 
given the corporation’s risk of default in mind, consider the following example and 
its conclusion about corporate wealth maximization. Recall that our fictional Firm 
had two investment choices. Option A had a 100% chance of earning a $76 million 
return. Option B is a riskier proposition, with only a 30% chance of success, but 
carries a potential return of $150 million. Now suppose that a third option is 
available and has an 80% chance of producing a $100 million return. Figure 2 
illustrates the decision before management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                
171. The recent struggles of the American automotive companies outside of 
bankruptcy demonstrate this point. 
172. See supra fig.1, at 1080. 
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Figure 2 
Option C, EVcorp = $80 million 
Expected manager payoff = -1 
 
Option A, EVcorp = $76 million                   Option B, EVcorp = $45 million 
Expected manager payoff = 1                 Expected manager payoff = -.021 
Manager 
 
 
Shareholders treat poorly (1)     30% win                             70% lose 
 
 
            SH treat well (4) CR treat poorly (-2) 
   
 
 
 
 Shareholders treat poorly (1)  Creditors treat poorly (-2) 
 
1 (0.3)(4) + (0.7)(-2) = -0.2 
 
In this example, a rational manager will choose Option A even though 
Option C has the highest expected return for the corporation. This is because, 
considering their own best interests, neither creditors nor shareholders will prefer 
Option C and so both will treat the manager poorly for choosing that option. 
Option C has an expected value for shareholders of $20 million, as opposed to the 
$22.5 million Option B offers. Option C has an expected value for creditors of $60 
million, which would still leave them undersecured as Option A would not. 
Because of the power creditors can yield, a rational manager would choose Option 
A over Option B under these circumstances. If shareholders and creditors could 
somehow pre-commit to treat the managers well, or at least to refrain from treating 
the managers poorly were Option C chosen, then the managers would be free to 
make the decision that accepts the appropriate amount of risk and carries the 
highest expected value for the corporation. 
This guaranteed soft landing for managers could take different forms. 
There is always the chance that the investment choice fails and in order for 
managers to take the risk anyway, the chance that they will be punished for taking 
the risk must be reduced. The current system tends to push managers either further 
toward complete risk aversion or toward the “nothing to lose” kind of risk 
preference of shareholders in a highly leveraged company.173 The fiduciary duty 
law that applies to directors has grown to protect directors from liability to either 
creditors or shareholders for preferring the interests of either group, as long as the 
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directors made an informed decision with a good faith interest in doing what is 
best for the corporation.174 Because other factors are at work in incentivizing and 
supervising them, managers are not so protected. No good reason explains the lack 
of protection, however, because we are as interested, if not more interested, in 
senior officers’ feeling free to make the decision that is best for the corporation’s 
wealth maximization, even if that decision will anger either shareholders or 
creditors. Because the punishment of officers does not require court approval or a 
litigant’s making it through the long and obstacle-ridden derivative suit process, 
corporate policy and legal rules cannot protect them as easily. Rather, a true 
balance of interests and powers between shareholders and creditors is most likely 
to result in the freedom managers will need to make the best decision for the 
corporation without particular reference to what decision either the creditors or 
shareholders would prefer or demand. Part V of this Article describes how to 
achieve this balance within the corporate decision making mechanism currently in 
place. 
Managers make difficult decisions when negotiating a loan agreement 
that will significantly affect the company if it encounters financial difficulty. The 
high rate of turnover among shareholders, and their relative inability to challenge 
meaningfully the terms of a loan, means that their interests are not necessarily 
accounted for when managers and creditors plan ahead for the possibility of the 
corporation’s default or insolvency. The lopsided representation of creditors in 
these circumstances may detract from managers’ ability to make wealth-
maximizing decisions for the corporation in times of financial distress. A more 
balanced representation of shareholder and creditor interests is needed to promote 
wealth-maximizing objectives and to preserve managerial independence from the 
whims of either constituency. The next Part explains how an equity trustee charged 
with the task of representing shareholder interests upon the occurrence of certain 
triggering events can help achieve the best balance. 
V. CHANGING CORPORATE POLICY AND PRACTICE TO MAXIMIZE 
WEALTH 
The key to finding a balance in corporate decision making that will allow 
the corporation’s bottom line to remain the primary focus and priority for officers 
is to balance the power and influence shareholders and creditors can exercise over 
the corporation throughout its life, but particularly when the company is in 
financial trouble. The particular need for a seat at the table for shareholders arises 
even as early as when the firm is thinking of entering into a significant credit 
agreement with bank lenders. The most efficient and productive way to address the 
competing pressures shareholders and creditors directly and indirectly place on 
management is to move the debate out of the managers’ minds and into an open 
negotiation between shareholders and creditors themselves, through their 
designated representatives. 
                                                                                                                
174. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 
A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns 
Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
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This Part of the Article explains what a shareholder representative, or 
equity trustee, would do, when its duties would be triggered, and how the equity 
trustee would be monitored. Corporate law and practice operate under the 
assumption that the shareholders’ interests are represented by a firm’s officers and 
directors.175 This may be true enough when the corporation is healthy, but the other 
factors weighing on managers’ decision making become more pronounced when 
the corporation endures financial difficulties. Silencing the shareholder voice and 
perspective under these circumstances can result in taking risk aversion too far, so 
that the corporation stops moving toward continued wealth maximization and 
becomes too conservative in its investments. Conversely, leaving creditors 
powerless during this time in some instances of a particularly strong equity 
presence176 can be just as harmful, by leaving unchecked strong incentives for risk 
preference.177 If shareholders and creditors can be brought together to negotiate 
over the supervision of management going forward and what powers each will 
have and be able to exercise over managerial decision making (and, in this 
instance, less is more), then managers will feel free to make wealth-maximizing 
decisions that might not be ideal from the standpoint of either constituency. 
This Part will begin by looking briefly at why altering the current regime 
of executive compensation is not the best way to adjust managerial incentives 
appropriately. Next, it will describe how informed and concentrated shareholder 
representation can work to balance effectively the power creditors have when a 
corporation is highly leveraged. Creditors may decide to charge more for credit. 
Shareholders may find that they are prepared to agree to higher interest rates in 
exchange for the freedom they can retain for managers to make decisions that may 
be more beneficial to shareholders. In the end, the goal should be to allow 
monitoring of management that prevents bad faith or disloyal conduct, but also to 
remember that managers owe loyalty to the corporation. Managers should not be 
punished for making decisions motivated by the best interests of the corporation.178 
                                                                                                                
175. Shareholders choose the directors of the corporation through voting and thus 
“[t]he directors and officers of a corporation independently owe fiduciary duties directly to 
the stockholders.” Arnold v. Soc’y. for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., No. 12883, 1995 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 86, at *24 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 
890 (Del. 1985)). 
176. Such a strong equity presence is most common in corporations where there is 
a concentration of stockholding in one person or entity. 
177. This can arise when the dominant equity presence can protect the managers 
and can provide or already has provided them with other employment opportunities if the 
current corporation fails. 
178. Managers could still be removed in the ordinary course by directors who feel 
that the officers are not particularly competent or are not exercising good judgment. As 
Baird and Rasmussen point out, having the best person in office is more important than 
aligning an officer’s individual incentives. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 39, at 931–32. 
Prime Directive reveals that having too quick a trigger finger can be damaging by itself. 
This Article maintains that corporate management can find the right answer for the 
corporation by listening to and balancing the interests of all corporate constituencies.  
Managers who are not making the best decisions for the corporation will still be removed 
through the usual process and that process may operate more efficiently with the input of 
shareholder and creditor representatives.  
1092 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50:1053 
Finally, this Part will describe exactly how the new position of a shareholder 
representative can be created and what it would look like, including how to select, 
pay, monitor, and appropriately incentivize the shareholder representative. 
A. Why Executive Compensation Is Not the Answer 
In the past, incentive compensation has served as the chief means to align 
managers’ incentives with the interests of shareholders.179 If the managers’ 
compensation depends upon maximizing the corporation’s profits, then they will 
have personal incentives to take actions consistent with that goal. Commentators 
have recognized possible problems with this means of aligning incentives. For 
instance, if managers’ compensation is based on enhanced earnings, then they will 
have incentives to take actions that increase the amounts reported on “earnings 
statements,” even if those same actions will have a negative impact on stock 
price.180 Conversely, payment with options, which should serve to reward officers 
for an increase in their firm’s stock price, may provide managers perverse 
incentives by making them too risk-preferring, even more so than shareholders 
would want them to be.181 We have learned from Enron, WorldCom, and other 
accounting disasters that increased stock prices do not necessarily mean increased 
corporate wealth.182 Shareholders have strong incentives to realize increased share 
prices in the short term, while that interest may not serve corporate wealth 
maximization.183 All of this demonstrates that incentive compensation can help to 
                                                                                                                
179. See William W. Bratton, Supersize Pay, Incentive Compatibility, and the 
Volatile Shareholder Interest, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 55, 98–100 (2006) (arguing that 
incentive compensation is designed to align managers with shareholders who want long 
term financial growth as opposed to short term speculative shareholders); Marcel Kahan, 
The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 
1878 (2001) (“The main issue in corporate governance is therefore to create incentives for 
managers to run the company in the interest of shareholders.”); Listokin, supra note 24, at 
783 (In a solvent corporation the shareholders are the residual claimants and the fiduciary 
duties of the managers are owed to the shareholder, but in bankruptcy it is not as easy to 
identify the residual claimants. In many cases the unsecured creditor’s committee is the 
residual claimant and they should be granted the right to give managers a percentage of the 
unsecured debt. This mechanism would “enable the residual claimants to align the 
incentives of the manager with their own.”). 
180. Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. 1976) (examining the 
case of shareholders who brought a derivative suit against the directors because they chose 
to issue a dividend instead of taking a loss on the earnings statement. The court dismissed 
the suit for failure to state a claim and applied business judgment rule protection to the 
decision of the board of directors.). 
181. Hu, supra note 20, at 318–32; Hu, supra note 46, at 1492–95. 
182. See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: 
A Critique of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 8–9 (2003) (In the Enron 
case the market failed to see that Enron was in fact not making money or acquiring wealth 
but the stock price tended to reflect a healthy corporation. Even after the stock price 
dropped by half, suggesting that the company was in trouble, the stock price was still much 
higher than the worth of the corporation.). 
183. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) 
(The shareholders of Time brought an action to enjoin the merger of Paramount and Time 
claiming that the Directors breached their fiduciary duties by not maximizing their short 
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a point, but each variety of incentive compensation may still pervert managers’ 
incentives to work for overall corporate wealth maximization. 
Beyond the basic inability to align managers’ incentives precisely with 
the interests of the shareholders or the corporation, the bigger problem with 
incentive compensation in financially distressed companies is that it often serves 
either to make managers too risk-averse or too risk-seeking and fails to strike the 
balance of risk preference that the corporation itself has184 as a distinct entity with 
“best interests” of its own.185 The executive compensation scheme designed at the 
outset for healthy companies focuses on aligning managers’ interests with those of 
shareholders. The presumption at the time is that what is good for shareholders 
will be good for the company. In the bankruptcy context, Professor Yair Listokin 
has suggested that companies compensate managers with debt, essentially because 
creditors have replaced shareholders as the residual claimants managers are 
charged with serving.186 Professor Skeel has considered how to pay managers in 
Chapter 11 to give them particular incentives, such as maximizing the wealth of 
the estate or reorganizing the company as quickly as possible.187 It might seem, 
then, at first blush, that the answer to the question of how to compensate managers 
when the corporation is in trouble, but not yet in bankruptcy, is to give them some 
incentive compensation that combines the solvent and bankruptcy approaches to 
approximate the firm’s capital structure. The problem when the corporation is in 
                                                                                                                
term shareholder value in the corporation. The court found that the directors did not have a 
Revlon duty to maximize the shareholders short term value); Hu & Westbrook, supra note 
4, at 1357–59.  
184. In financially distressed or bankrupt companies, creditors or vulture investors 
take over and avail themselves of compensation plans that try to align managerial interests 
with their own. Henderson, supra note 24, at 1572–78. 
185. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. 
A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *33–34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (“At least where a 
corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the 
agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise”); Hu, supra 
note 20, at 334–35 (noting that incentivizing too much can create “managerial 
gamesmanship,” and entrench managers in the firm through overinvestment. On the other 
hand, bonus related compensation will create incentives for managers to invest in short term 
projects that create a profit, and not long term growth oriented endeavors because the profits 
from these projects will not be realized in the present.). 
186. Listokin, supra note 24, at 803. Listokin writes: 
Debt compensation aligns the incentives of managers with the incentives 
of the typical residual claimants in bankruptcy—the unsecured creditors. 
As a result, debt compensation encourages a manager to pursue actions 
that are in her self-interest, while also improving the return of the 
unsecured creditors. Just as grants of stock options and restricted stock 
are believed to foster good behavior in managers of solvent firms, so too 
does unsecured debt compensation promote value-maximizing behavior 
in managers of bankrupt firms. This alignment of a manager’s incentives 
with those of bankruptcy’s typical residual claimants makes debt 
compensation an improvement upon other pay-for-performance plans 
and proposals. 
Id. 
187. Skeel, supra note 24, at 919, 927. 
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financial trouble is not that the managers do not have enough at stake; it is, rather, 
that they have their very livelihood to lose, and this causes them either to be too 
risk-averse, which is more likely in a large, public corporation, or far too risk-
preferring, more likely in a corporation in which equity is significantly 
concentrated in one entity.188 
Tying the managers’ personal wealth more closely to the corporation’s 
serves only to misalign their incentives from those of the corporation’s constituent 
parties. Recall that corporations are designed to be riskier endeavors than savings 
accounts.189 If a manager will lose everything if the corporation goes under, or if 
the shareholders are sufficiently angered, or if the creditors can declare a default, 
he will be far more risk-averse in his decision making than the best financial 
interests of the corporation would dictate.190 Therefore, making the manager’s 
short-term interests depend too heavily on the corporation’s remaining afloat or 
upon his making certain decisions will compromise his independent decision 
making. That independent decision making is essential to looking objectively at 
corporate choices and taking the course of action that will most likely enhance 
corporate wealth, even without the express approval of shareholders or creditors. 
Another possible solution is to give the manager the right to collect some 
compensation in the future that depends on how well the corporation did during his 
tenure. This only works, of course, if the corporation still exists after he leaves it. 
If the corporation enters bankruptcy, the manager would receive a priority claim 
for any back salary and an administrative claim for any salary earned during the 
bankruptcy.191 The manager has an incentive to maximize corporate wealth in 
order to collect on his claim. If the corporation does particularly well, either by 
avoiding bankruptcy or by earning a significant sum in bankruptcy, the manager 
will be able to collect on a greater percentage of his claim. The threat of being 
removed from office by creditors inside or outside of bankruptcy may still weigh 
more heavily on managers than whatever chance they may have of recovering 
some or all of the salary the company owes them.192 Being removed by creditors 
may adversely impact their chances of finding another managerial position with 
another company and that next job may prove much more lucrative than whatever 
income could be salvaged from the current company.193 Outside of bankruptcy, a 
manager could be incentivized with a future approximation of the corporation’s 
                                                                                                                
188. See Hu, supra note 20, at 328 (“Shareholdings can exacerbate a problem of 
inadequate diversification by managers and actually can make managers more reluctant to 
choose appropriately risky projects.”). 
189. See id. at 320–22. 
190. Id. 
191. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2006). 
192. Adler, supra note 49, at 359 (explaining that managers favor reorganization 
over liquidation, in part, because they want to keep their jobs). 
193. “[S]tudies have shown that the management that led the company into 
financial distress is very often replaced, before or after the Chapter 11 petition is filed. For 
those reasons, notwithstanding the DIP system, management may have substantial 
incentives to resolve the debtor’s financial difficulties outside of bankruptcy.” Hu & 
Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1377 (citing Barry E. Adler et al., Destruction of Value in the 
New Era of Chapter 11, at 12, 29 (Oct. 24, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=795987). 
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wealth during his term with an incentive-laden severance package or retirement 
plan. This may still cause managers to remain too risk-averse and depends on the 
corporation’s continued solvency of the corporation, something the manager may 
not necessarily be able to control. All of these compensation alternatives are more 
effective in healthy companies.194 They also keep the hypothetical bargaining 
between the shareholder and creditor positions in a manager’s head, which 
imposes a significant agency cost. Appointing an equity trustee may help to reduce 
this agency cost and promote bargaining between the parties, by allowing a 
shareholder representative to argue in favor of shareholder interests even when the 
corporation is in trouble. 
B. The Equity Trustee—A Seat at the Table for Shareholders 
Giving shareholders informed, unified representation would leave 
managers free to take the business risks most likely to lead to corporate wealth 
maximization. A shareholder representative, or equity trustee, would be able to 
provide balance against creditor power in a troubled company, so that creditor 
influence does not dominate managerial decision making. An equity trustee would 
achieve this balance by enhancing the other side of the payoff equation, and 
specifically by curtailing the powers creditors reserve in loan covenants. Managers 
who make bad judgments or who do not perform competently or faithfully can still 
be removed by the board of directors. Even though the shareholders can exercise 
their powers over management more effectively through a single representative, 
those powers will remain limited by corporate law so that shareholders cannot 
unduly force their preferences on management or make business decisions. The 
very purpose of the equity trustee, as this Article conceives it, is to balance the 
powers creditors assume so that managers will be more likely to maintain the 
independence to make corporate wealth maximizing decisions. 
A shareholder representative can only be effective in this role if the 
creditor parties and management hear and respect the position he or she advocates. 
At first blush, it may seem that the equity trustee would be as ignored as 
shareholders typically are in this context. Further, it may seem that the equity 
trustee simply creates new agency costs rather than alleviating others. This section 
will show how bankruptcy practices can inform the design of an equity trustee that 
will operate outside of bankruptcy in a way that will make that representative an 
influential advocate in the negotiation of corporate debt. It will also demonstrate 
the importance of defining the rights and responsibilities of the equity trustee so as 
to ensure that it is a meaningful advocate for shareholder preferences both when 
corporate debt is taken on and when the corporation is in the zone of insolvency, a 
time when shareholder preferences may not have been properly defended in the 
past.195 
                                                                                                                
194. Henderson, supra note 24, at 1569, 1573–75. 
195. Skeel, supra note 67, at 500–02. 
[W]hile the shareholders of a healthy firm are its true residual owners 
and, as a result, are the appropriate plaintiffs of a derivative suit outside 
of bankruptcy, most corporations have become insolvent by the time 
they file for bankruptcy. Because they have little financial interest in an 
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1. How Bankruptcy Practices Can Be Instructive 
Once a corporation enters bankruptcy, it is operated for the benefit of its 
creditors.196 Creditors can exert significant control over a corporation in 
bankruptcy, particularly through the committee of unsecured creditors (the 
“creditors’ committee”) that is appointed in large, corporate bankruptcies. The 
creditors’ committee represents the interests of the corporation’s unsecured 
creditors and consists of the company’s seven largest unsecured creditors.197 In 
most cases, when the debtor company is insolvent, the creditors’ committee 
represents the residual claim. In cases where the company has or is likely to have 
some equity remaining, the bankruptcy court will appoint an equity committee.198 
The equity committee will represent the shareholder interests and is authorized to 
take action within the bankruptcy case on the shareholders’ behalf.199 While 
bankruptcy is admittedly a different beast because, for instance, managerial 
authority in bankruptcy is seriously constrained by the bankruptcy court and the 
influence of the representative committees,200 the use of equity committees in 
bankruptcy and the success they enjoy,201 even when there is little or no equity 
value remaining, may inform the potential utility of an equity trustee. 
The U.S. Trustee appoints the seven largest equity security holders to the 
equity committee.202 The equity committee members then select a team of 
attorneys, accountants, and other professionals to represent the committee’s 
interests in the bankruptcy case.203 An equity committee’s representatives are 
compensated by the bankruptcy estate for its reasonable fees for actions it takes 
that are helpful to the estate.204 The equity committee and the creditors’ committee 
may both exercise significant control over the debtor and are granted a right of 
access to important information about the debtor.205 The input of the committees 
                                                                                                                
insolvent firm, and because most or all of any recovery would go to 
higher priority claimants, shareholders lose much of their incentive to 
promote and participate in derivative litigation. 
Id. at 500–01. Skeel further comments that plaintiff’s attorneys, like the shareholders, also 
lose incentives in bankruptcy because of the loss of control of the derivative litigation to the 
bankruptcy court. Furthermore, derivative litigation can be seen as disruptive to the overall 
reorganization process and the attorney will have to justify the litigation and the attorneys 
fees to the bankruptcy judge. Id. at 501. A shareholder representative can give continuity 
between stages of corporate existence and can be a useful tool for interested, sophisticated 
shareholders. 
196. Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligation to Creditors, 17 
CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 667 (1996). 
197. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (2006). 
198. Id. § 1102(a)(1). 
199. Id. § 1103(c). 
200. Alces, supra note 97, at 134–39. 
201. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s 
Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. 
REV. 125, 138–39 (1990). 
202. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(2). 
203. Id. § 1103(a). 
204. Id. § 503(b)(1)(D)(3). 
205. Section 1103(c) of the Bankruptcy Code states: 
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cannot be ignored by the debtor in possession (DIP) or trustee because both 
committees will have to vote on and approve any plan of reorganization,206 and 
both can move to appoint a trustee if they think the DIP, meaning the debtor’s 
current management, is behaving fraudulently or incompetently.207 Equity 
committees are not ignored when the plan is being formulated or when the estate’s 
assets are being distributed to its claimants, even when the company is 
insolvent.208 
In an empirical study on the subject, Professors Lynn LoPucki and 
William Whitford discovered that debtor and creditor attorneys agreed to provide 
some degree of return to equity holders even when they had no legal right to a 
portion of the estate’s assets.209 The reason appears to be that the lawyers 
representing the corporate debtors, members of creditors committees, and equity 
committees interact professionally on a regular basis and so are engaged in a 
continuing game of sorts.210 Game theory dictates that repeat players will treat one 
another fairly, or, in these cases, perhaps more than fairly, because they hope to 
receive the same treatment from the others in the future.211 All of these elements of 
equity representation can be transported out of bankruptcy and adapted to the zone 
of insolvency situation, or circumstances in which the corporation’s debt structure 
may significantly change in order to allow shareholders’ interests to be represented 
in an effective, informed, sophisticated, and cohesive way. 
                                                                                                                
 A committee appointed under section 1102 of this title may –  
 (1) consult with the trustee of debtor in possession concerning 
the administration of the case;  
 (2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and 
financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s business 
and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other 
matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan; 
 (3) participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those 
represented by such committee of such committee’s determinations as to 
any plan formulated, and collect and file with the court acceptances or 
rejections of a plan; 
 (4) request the appointment of a trustee or examiner under 
section 1104 of this title; and 
 (5) perform such other services as are in the interest of those 
represented. 
Id. 
206. TABB, supra note 101, at 807. 
207. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a). 
208. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 201, at 138. 
209. Id. at 194–95 (explaining that shareholders exert pressure on the debtor’s 
counsel (through threatened litigation or simply through threats of professional 
awkwardness and estrangement) so that the debtor’s counsel feels obligated to give the 
shareholders a cut of the estate’s assets). 
210. Id. 
211. DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 5, at 265. 
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2. The Mechanics of the Equity Trustee 
The equity trustee is modeled on the indenture trustee in bond 
issuances212 and the equity committee in bankruptcy. An indenture trustee 
represents the interests of widely dispersed bondholders upon certain named events 
in the life of the indenture agreement. Shareholder opinions have long been 
silenced and largely ignored, because shareholders in public corporations not only 
are rationally apathetic,213 but also generally lack the business experience and 
access to the detailed corporate information necessary to make informed, well-
reasoned decisions about corporate business.214 While managerial independence in 
decision making should still be the paramount object of corporate governance laws 
and practices, there is a way for shareholders to have the same kind of 
sophisticated, informed representation creditors enjoy when necessary. The equity 
trustee must be designed so that it can be an effective advocate of shareholder 
interests, is well-monitored, and has the right incentives. This section will discuss 
how the equity trustee would be chosen and compensated, and considers possible 
creditor objections to its existence. 
An equity trustee would be appointed by a committee of the corporation’s 
seven largest equity holders as measured at a certain time each year.215 Many 
professional companies could decide to offer equity trustee services. Corporate 
consulting companies come to mind as particularly qualified. Investment banks 
could also form divisions to offer these services, as could large, institutional 
investors.216 As with any other professional representative, the equity trustee 
would be empowered to retain lawyers, accountants, and other professionals to aid 
in its representation of a corporation’s shareholders. Like an indenture trustee, the 
equity trustee would monitor the corporation and remain informed as to its 
financial condition and important business decisions and capital structure, ready to 
spring into action when its agreement with the corporation requires it. Because the 
shareholders in public corporations are so diffuse and change daily, an agreement 
with “the shareholders” as a distinct body is infeasible. The equity trustee would 
have to enter an agreement with and receive compensation from the corporation on 
the shareholders’ behalf. This does make the equity trustee a creditor of the 
                                                                                                                
212. In fact, scholars have suggested replacing traditional indenture trustees with 
a supertrustee that would represent all public debt in many of the same ways the equity 
trustee suggested in this Article would represent shareholders. Yakov Amihud et al., A New 
Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 447 (1999). 
213. See Rock, supra note 64, at 455–56. 
214. Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
605, 625–26 (2007). 
215. Some institutional shareholders and scholars have suggested the use of 
shareholder committees to advise management on various aspects of corporate business. 
The suggestions have been met with hostility by management, but interest from 
shareholders. All of the committees would have enhanced shareholder powers or would 
have involved more direct shareholder involvement in business decisions. Rock, supra note 
64, at 490–503. The equity trustee I propose avoids those potentially costly pitfalls. 
216. Proxy advisors, who work to compile information about companies and to 
make voting recommendations to institutional investors, may also be able to adapt their 
businesses to the demands of the equity trustee trade. 
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corporation, but gives the equity trustee priority in bankruptcy.217 While it may 
seem that paying the equity trustee in the same way as managers and making the 
trustee a creditor of the corporation compromises the equity trustee’s loyalties, one 
should keep in mind that the equity trustee would owe enforceable fiduciary duties 
to the shareholders and no other constituents. The equity trustee will not be 
protected by a business judgment rule or other procedural shields available to 
directors. An equity trustee really would be an employee of the shareholders and 
would be directly accountable to and removable by them. Shareholders would not 
rely on payment of the equity trustee to align its incentives or monitor it and equity 
trustees would care more about the overall success of its business, measured by the 
satisfaction of the shareholders it serves, than it would about the recovery of a 
particular fee. 
The equity trustee I propose is not a mandatory one. It is created by 
private contracts between the corporation and its shareholders, as well as the 
corporation and the appointed equity trustee. Shareholders may demand that a 
corporation provide them an equity trustee and may find that the best way to force 
the managers to use the equity trustee as they intend is to amend the bylaws to 
require the appointment of a trustee and to allow the trustee to have certain 
representative powers at enumerated times. These bylaw amendments would 
constitute the agreement between the shareholders and corporation about how an 
equity trustee will be used. The corporation, through its management, will then 
negotiate an agreement with the equity trustee, which will be subject to approval 
by the group of shareholders responsible for choosing the trustee. 
Shareholders should anticipate that the corporation would spend money to 
provide them an enhanced presence and independent voice in the corporation 
within the zone of insolvency, particularly if such a presence will prove beneficial 
to the corporate enterprise as a whole. The presence of an equity trustee may 
comfort shareholders and minimize precipitous declines in share price upon bad 
financial news and may prevent such a decline in the face of enhanced debt or debt 
reorganization negotiations. Exiting shareholders may realize more on the sale of 
their stock on account of the services the equity trustee has provided. The presence 
of an equity trustee may also make it more likely that a company that should 
liquidate would actually do so because it has pushed the corporation to continue to 
take business risks rather than fold into a position of purely conserving assets for 
reorganization. This may provide efficiency from which investors as a whole 
would benefit. Further, large shareholders, particularly those who invest in 
troubled companies, may grow to insist on equity trustee representation. They may 
benefit from the similar kind of informed representation creditors enjoy when the 
corporation is in trouble. An equity trustee that has been paying attention to the 
corporation for a long time may prove a valuable asset to “vulture investors,” who 
buy stock in the company in the final stages before bankruptcy. The enhanced 
information available to and analyzed for shareholders may allow investors to 
                                                                                                                
217. The equity trustee would at least receive priority as a corporate employee for 
fees earned 180 days before the bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2006). To the 
extent the equity trustee continues to serve after the bankruptcy filing, it could receive 
administrative priority. Id. § 503(b). 
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make better investment decisions, and allow the market to identify more accurately 
companies with the potential for future profits and those without it. 
Creditors, however, are not likely to be so sanguine about allowing the 
corporation to incur an additional expense for the benefit of shareholders, 
particularly one they see as posing a direct threat to their repayment and control 
when the corporation has limited resources. Creditors are unlikely to endorse any 
action that would enhance management consideration of shareholders. Still, 
creditors would not stop lending in the face of the use of an equity trustee. Banks 
need to lend to large corporations as much as public firms in financial distress need 
to borrow. They may, however, respond by increasing the price they charge for 
credit. That response would impose an additional cost on the corporation, a cost 
that may be directly associated with the creation of an equity trustee, insofar as the 
trustee’s work limits the control over the corporation creditors can reserve in loan 
covenants. Shareholders may choose to allow this extra cost, or the equity trustee 
may recommend that they do so because paying additional interest may be 
preferable to allowing creditors to take disproportionate control over the 
management of the corporation in troubled times.  
This tradeoff becomes particularly palatable if we accept that the 
existence of an equity trustee means that shareholders should not necessarily give 
up their shares when a corporation experiences financial difficulty. There are two 
reasons shareholders may retain their investment if an equity trustee is present. 
First, the equity trustee could represent their interests during that difficult time, so 
that shareholder powers do not become irrelevant to managers and hope of 
shareholder returns in the zone of insolvency is enhanced. Second, balancing 
creditor and shareholder powers serves to lower the cost of corporate financial 
difficulty to shareholders and managers alike. Managers will have greater job 
security; shareholders will have less risk-averse managers at the helm of their 
company and, therefore, a better potential for higher returns. Even if banks insist 
upon charging onerous interest rates, corporations may decide to issue more public 
debt as an alternative to borrowing from institutional lenders. If this is the case, the 
bondholders will benefit from the presence of an indenture trustee. The 
shareholders should enjoy the same advantage in the form of their equity trustee. 
Preserving the importance of shareholder interests in troubled times should prevent 
managers from agreeing to give the store to creditors upon the occurrence of 
“material adverse effects” or broadly defined events of default.218 Limiting creditor 
power aligns managers’ incentives with the goal of corporate wealth 
maximization. 
                                                                                                                
218. Creating a “highly leveraged capital structure” imposes a duty to pay 
principal and interest payments and thus limits or constrains managers in their decision 
making and allows shareholders or equity holders to retain some control. See Larry E. 
Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1431, 1468 (2006) (citing Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, 
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 323 (1986)). 
2008] STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE 1101 
3. The Equity Trustee’s Role and Duties 
The equity trustee will represent shareholder interests when the 
corporation negotiates or reorganizes major loans and when the corporation 
experiences financial difficulty. This is achieved several ways. First, the equity 
trustee will participate in loan negotiations to make recommendations about the 
use of covenants and the definition of events of default. An equity trustee may 
only be necessary when the corporation is in financial trouble, reorganizes its loan 
obligations, or negotiates loans considered risky by lenders. If creditors can 
discern objectively what a risky loan is, the corporation should be able to use the 
same measures to define by bylaw and agreement when a loan negotiation will 
require the presence of an equity trustee. Second, the equity trustee will either 
approve the agreement reached or inform the corporation’s shareholders of its 
disapproval and the grounds therefore. Third, when the corporation reorganizes its 
capital structure or is in perilous financial waters, the equity trustee will be entitled 
to all of the financial disclosures creditors receive, and will have responsibility for 
communicating its impressions of the corporation’s financial position and the 
effectiveness of management to shareholders. Fourth, if the equity trustee believes 
the directors or officers are breaching their fiduciary duties to the corporation or 
shareholders, it can sue on the shareholders’ behalf. Fifth, the equity trustee will be 
able to launch proxy contests to seek and vote shareholder proxies at shareholder 
meetings. This will give the equity trustee a powerful influence in the election of 
directors who, in turn, choose corporate officers without unnecessarily increasing 
the shareholders’ legal entitlements to power over corporate management. 
Corporations will require an equity trustee’s services in certain, specifically 
defined circumstances. 
4. When the Equity Trustee Is Triggered 
For the purposes of this Article, the equity trustee is a device corporations 
would use when certain circumstances are present that may compromise 
shareholder interests in favor of those of creditors. I save for another day the 
question of whether an equity trustee could be used at other times in a 
corporation’s life. Even though the equity trustee will only actively participate in 
corporate affairs upon the occurrence of certain events, it may be necessary to 
designate a trustee before the triggers occur. This keeps a well-informed equity 
trustee at the ready, able to assert itself when its contract so designates. The only 
other alternative is for shareholders to require the corporation to notify them of the 
occurrence of triggering events so that they can find and appoint an equity trustee. 
If an equity trustee is not named before its duties are triggered, managers may not 
be forthcoming about when an equity trustee could be used, and shareholders may 
find out too late. This section of the Article discusses two circumstances under 
which an equity trustee would be particularly useful. The first is negotiation of 
major loan agreements and the second is when the corporation experiences serious 
financial difficulty as defined in the equity trustee’s agreement or in the 
corporation’s equity trustee provision. 
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Recall that the initial business risk at issue is the decision to enter into the 
loan and agree to strict covenants.219 In such situations, one may argue that 
management is the shareholder representative. That may be true insofar as the 
managers are deciding to take a business risk by borrowing money to make an 
investment they believe will enhance corporate wealth. The managers appear to 
make the risk-preferring decision for shareholders at that point. If the investment 
succeeds, the company can repay the loan with cash to spare, and if it fails, the 
current shareholders will not be around to complain about the creditor control. 
This failure to account for the shareholder position and the representation of their 
preferences if the company fails leads to the problem this Article seeks to 
address.220 Managers act on the good-faith, but mistaken, belief that they can 
ignore a separate set of shareholder preferences simply because the creditors 
would take over as residual claimants.221 
The shareholder preferences are different and very valuable when the 
corporation is in trouble. Providing the shareholders a sophisticated, informed 
representative to participate in corporate decision making when the corporation’s 
debt is set to change or become an issue will serve to balance the creditor interests 
and potential powers. There are two advantages to this approach. First, creditors 
will not be able to exercise more power over managerial decision making than 
shareholders could. Second, shareholder preferences and the benefits of the 
investment risks they would support are not lost when the corporation is in 
financial trouble, because a shareholder representative will remain actively 
interested in advocating and litigating on behalf of shareholder interests, if 
necessary, long after equity’s value has seriously declined. This balance will allow 
managers to make the decision they honestly believe to be in the best interests of 
the corporation without fear of retribution from either shareholders or creditors, 
and will allow managers to exercise independent decision making authority under 
only the supervision of the board of directors. This is the decision making model 
corporate law has identified as most profitable.222 No good reason exists for 
creditors to dominate managerial decision making, and there is no reason to 
                                                                                                                
219. See supra Part IV.A. 
220. Henry Hu suggests that corporations appoint a committee of directors to 
particularly represent the investment preferences of shareholders. Hu, supra note 20, at 
367–70. This acknowledges the need for a voice that is particularly devoted to shareholder 
investment interests, even when a corporation is solvent. Asking a director to change his 
allegiance, though, from one owing to the corporation as a whole to one devoted 
particularly to shareholder interests may pose problems. However, I do not recommend 
changing the fiduciary duties owed by directors or how directors should exercise those 
duties. Rather, I propose the creation of a separate shareholder representative who can work, 
without fear of litigation or conflicting interests, entirely for the representation of 
shareholder preferences in times of financial difficulty. 
221. Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1344. 
222. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors . . . .”); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[The business 
judgment rule] is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company.”). 
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believe that such dominance would serve to maximize corporate wealth, because 
maximization of corporate wealth beyond the point of creditor repayment is not in 
the creditors’ best interests. 
The equity trustee will serve to represent the shareholders when corporate 
debt arrangements are made or altered, and will also be a shareholder 
representative when the corporation is in the zone of insolvency. The presence of 
the equity trustee in the zone of insolvency will keep the shareholder voice from 
falling out of the corporate decision making process and will provide a shareholder 
representative that has a continued incentive to represent the equity interest even 
when the value of the equity position is very low or worthless. Because this Article 
seeks to solve the problems caused by increased managerial risk aversion in the 
zone of insolvency, I propose to limit the equity trustee to this time in a 
corporation’s life. The zone of insolvency is, of course, difficult to define. Each 
corporation must do so in a way most appropriate for it, much in the same way 
they define default with creditors. Perhaps a corporation enters the zone if it does 
not meet earnings expectations or if it climbs above a certain debt to equity ratio or 
if a certain percentage of the firm’s assets are hypothecated as collateral on a loan. 
The contours of the zone of insolvency may vary by company or industry, and I 
will leave it to the appropriately trained professionals to define it for each 
agreement. Like an indenture trustee on a bond issuance, the equity trustee will 
receive periodic disclosures from the corporation and remain apprised of its 
financial condition and major decisions, but will only participate in corporate 
negotiations when the company’s capital structure may change in a significant 
way, when the corporation plans to take on substantial additional debt or 
reorganize old debt, or when the firm is experiencing financial difficulty. 
5. Why the Equity Trustee Is Effective 
One of the more persistent arguments against shareholder activism is that 
shareholders are relatively unsophisticated and uninformed, and they cannot act 
with a single, unified voice.223 Creditors do not have that problem. Appointing a 
shareholder representative to remain informed about corporate affairs gives the 
shareholders a single, unitary, sophisticated voice in communicating with 
management. The use of such a representative moots any advantages creditors may 
                                                                                                                
223. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting 
Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 626 (2006). Bainbridge writes: 
Active investor involvement in corporate decisionmaking seems likely to 
disrupt the very mechanism that makes the public corporation 
practicable; namely, the centralization of essentially nonreviewable 
decisionmaking authority in the board of directors. The chief economic 
virtue of the public corporation is not that it permits the aggregation of 
large capital pools, as some have suggested, but rather that it provides a 
hierarchical decisionmaking structure well-suited to the problem of 
operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees, 
managers, shareholders, creditors, and other inputs. . . . Shareholder 
activism necessarily contemplates that institutions will review 
management decisions, step in when management performance falters, 
and exercise voting control to effect a change in policy or personnel. 
Id. 
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have in monitoring corporate governance. A shareholder representative available 
to participate in the negotiation of significant credit agreements and to represent 
the shareholder position even after equity has little or no value, will allow the 
shareholders to prevent creditors from exercising undue control over management, 
and will also promote the best interests of corporate wealth maximization, even 
after specific shareholders have exited the firm. The continuity of the shareholder 
position that a shareholder representative can provide, can serve to enhance 
corporate wealth. That only works, of course, if the shareholder representative’s 
voice is one management cannot ignore. 
One may ask why we would expect managers or creditor representatives 
to give any credence to a shareholder representative, particularly in light of the fact 
that the equity trustee has no directly exercisable authority over corporate 
management and the powers the trustee could wield are based on the very limited 
and indirect powers afforded shareholders. The effectiveness of equity committees 
in bankruptcy, even where the corporation is insolvent and no equity remains, 
demonstrates how successful a respected professional can be in negotiating some 
concessions for his client.224 Of course, the fact that an equity trustee may have the 
power to motivate shareholders to exercise their voting rights, to sue management 
derivatively, or to rally public opinion against a certain company’s management, 
makes the trustee’s voice impossible to ignore completely. The equity trustee 
eliminates the shareholders’ traditional weakness as a corporate constituency 
caused by their wide dispersal, inability to confer with each other, and rational 
apathy.225 An equity trustee that can summon the power of the shareholders, 
though effectively and legally limited, is a force to be reckoned with. 
There may be some concern that we should not encourage a system in 
which shareholders are able to receive benefits to which they are not legally 
entitled, just because they have a particularly effective representative. This is not a 
valid concern for two reasons. First, creditors have been able to, and have made 
quite a business out of, effectively reserving for themselves powers that would 
lead to lender liability226 if those powers were explicitly reserved to them or 
exercised. While this Article argues that such powers are not warranted, they are 
indeed the effect of rigorous bargaining by the interested parties. This Article does 
not argue that such agreements should be outlawed but, rather, suggests that the 
parties can reach a more efficient agreement, and one more beneficial to the 
corporation in the long run, if another constituent’s—the shareholders’—interests 
are more fully considered and actively represented. Second, if, through open 
bargaining with creditors and managers, shareholders can extract benefits they 
could not otherwise demand under state law, there is nothing in that outcome that 
is inconsistent with the tenets or goals of Delaware corporate law, and such a result 
is likely efficient if it is the product of fair, arm’s length bargaining. Such creative 
bargaining should be favored above agreements imposed on parties by inflexible 
state law considered and enacted ex ante. As the Coase Theorem tells us, if 
                                                                                                                
224. LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 201, at 194−95. See supra text 
accompanying notes 209−11. 
225. Rock, supra note 64, at 453−64.  
226. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1235–36. 
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transaction costs are low, parties will devise an optimal rule through bargaining.227 
Let us now turn to a discussion of the transaction costs imposed by the equity 
trustee. 
6. Another Agent to Monitor 
There could be concern that an equity trustee would raise the costs 
associated with entering loan agreements and operating the company in the zone of 
insolvency. The proposition adds yet another agent with its own, unique agency 
costs. Nevertheless, it lowers the agency costs associated with managerial 
uncertainty and misaligned incentives in times of financial difficulty. The equity 
trustee is a more closely monitored agent and owes fiduciary duties directly to 
shareholders. Shareholders know that their interests and only their interests will be 
represented by the equity trustee. In many ways, the fiduciary duties owed by a 
trustee to one, identifiable beneficiary—here, the equity position228—are easier to 
enforce than corporate fiduciary duties because of the procedural barriers to 
shareholder derivative suits that Delaware corporate law has erected. While 
corporate fiduciary duties have been analogized to the duties owed by trustees, the 
analogy is not perfect, and enforcing fiduciary duties against traditional trustees is 
easier than enforcing the same duties against corporate managers who have the 
benefit of a business judgment rule and a prohibitive litigation scheme. In this 
way, shareholders could use fiduciary duties to monitor an equity trustee much less 
expensively and more effectively than they can use the same principles to monitor 
managers in the first place. Furthermore, the equity trustee will owe fiduciary 
duties specifically to the shareholders and only to the shareholders. Corporate 
managers, on the other hand, owe duties to the entire corporate enterprise and so it 
has become increasingly clear that shareholders cannot use the fiduciary 
mechanism to defend their position and preferences alone.229 The bargaining the 
managers, creditors, and equity trustee will engage in will lower the agency costs 
associated with trusting that negotiation to the indirectly conferred incentives 
enjoyed by management. By adding an equity trustee, we add an agent directly 
monitored by and responsible to shareholder interests—an agent who lowers the 
overall agency costs associated with leaving managerial decision making exposed 
to the possibility of significant creditor control. 
Further, equity trustees will likely have a number of corporate or 
corporate−shareholder clients, just like other professionals retained by 
corporations. This means that various equity trustees would work to build a 
reputation in the market and would place a high value on maintaining a favorable 
reputation that is likely to bring more work their way. The importance of their 
reputation to their ultimate success would serve as a strong check on the agency 
                                                                                                                
227. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). 
228. See Hu, supra note 20, at 288–89 (Though many shareholders make up the 
collective equity interest, the shareholder interest may nevertheless be identified as a 
singular “beneficiary.”). 
229. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 298 (1999) (“Corporate law only permits shareholders 
to bring successful derivative claims against directors in circumstances where bringing such 
claims benefits not only shareholders, but other stakeholders in the coalition as well.”). 
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costs associated with any kind of fiduciary relationship. Shareholders could 
obviously sue an equity trustee for breach of fiduciary duty, but the more effective 
and less expensive check on equity trustee power and incentives will be the 
importance of an equity trustee’s reputation to his, her, or its success on the 
market.230 Granted, reputational constraints are not perceived as being very 
forceful in the wake of the failures of accountants and SEC analysts whose 
concerns about reputation did not prevent wrongdoing in the case of Enron. An 
equity trustee’s incentives are tied less to the success of the corporation and more 
to the quality of representation the shareholders get. An equity trustee needs to 
demonstrate to the market that it is a good monitor, that it effectively 
communicates important information to shareholders, and that it gives good advice 
and effectively uses the tools available to it for disciplining management. 
Furthermore, because, for the purposes of this Article, an equity trustee becomes 
more active when the corporation is in financial trouble, its reputation will not 
depend on how well the company appears to be doing to the market. In this way, 
its reputation will not be as dangerously tied to management’s success as those 
involved in the Enron disaster. An equity trustee’s success is also tied to reputation 
because it depends in part on how effective the equity trustee is in negotiating with 
managers and creditors on the shareholders’ behalf. Only an equity trustee that 
commands the respect of the leaders in the corporate governance and financial 
marketplaces will be an effective representative for shareholders. 
CONCLUSION 
 Managers of financially distressed companies face competing interests in 
deciding how best to operate the firm while also trying to keep their jobs. Creditors 
can exercise significant control over how a company in the zone of insolvency is 
run, while shareholders choose to exit the firm and so do not exert their will as 
forcefully. The loss of the shareholder voice can result in a loss of managerial 
incentives to make value-maximizing decisions, as already risk-averse managers 
become even more cautious under the watchful eyes of creditors. Providing a 
shareholder advocate in the form of an equity trustee to represent equity 
preferences when a corporation is in severe financial trouble or reorganizes its debt 
or capital structure can provide a balance against the significant powers reserved 
by creditors, so that managers remain free to make investment decisions that will 
maximize corporate wealth. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                
230. Whether an equity trustee should be an individual (as a bankruptcy trustee is) 
or a company or institution (like indenture trustees are) is not certain. The exact formulation 
of an equity trustee business and the most effective combination of credentials and 
experience for an equity trustee is left to another article. 
